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PREFACE 
"The ~70rZd  p o p u l a t i o n  i s  now p a s s i n g  t h e  four  b i l l i o n  ma~.:c, 
and a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  i t  would d o u b l e  t w i c e  t o  
a b o u t  f i f t e e n  b i l l i o n  by t h e  y e a r  2050. Y e t  t h e r e  a r e  t h o s e  who 
s a y  t h a t  i t  w i l l  do w e l l  t o  m a i n t a i n  i t s  p r e s e n t  l e v e l .  Many 
i n d i v i d u a l s  a l r e a d y  b o r n  w i l l  be a l i v e  i n  2050; i t  i s  h a r d l y  v e r y  
i n f o r m a t i v e  t o  know t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  be accompanied by be tween  
4 and 15 b i l l i o n  peop le . "  
T h i s  i s  how Nathan K e y f i t z  opens  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  on wor ld  
p o p u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p a p e r ,  w r i t t e n  d u r i n g  h i s  s t a y  a t  
IIASA i n  September 1976 .  H e  conc ludes  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  i s  l i k e l y  
t o  l i e  i n  t h e  r a n g e  o f  6.5-8.5 b i l l i o n  peop le .  
D r .  K e y f i t z '  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  ha9e been impor t an t  f o r  IIASA's 
Energy Systems Program a t t e m p t i n g  t o  p u t  t o g e t h e r  t h e  w e a l t h  of  
knowledge on  energy  and r e l a t e d  matters, i n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  a 
comprehensive view o f  t h e  g l o b a l  long- and medium-term energy  
problem. 
On t h e  o c c a s i o n  o f  o u r  for thcoming f i n a l  r e p o r t  on Phase  I 
o f  o u r  a c t i v i t i e s ,  w e  f e e l  t h a t  it i s  wor thwhi le  t h e r e f o r e  t o  
p u b l i s h  D r .  K e y f i t z '  p a p e r ,  making it a c c e s s i b l e  t o  a wider  
a u d i e n ce .  
Wolf H a f e l e  
Deputy D i r e c t o r  
Program Leader ,  Energy Systems 

SUMMARY 
Low and high estimates are calculated for three categories 
of less developed countries (LDCs). The low figure for the year 
2050 is 5,099.5, the high one is 7,184.5, all in millions. Add- 
ing the 1,400 millions for the developed countries (on which all 
estimates agree closely) gives a range of 6,500 to 8,600 mil- 
lions for the world population in the year 2050; the ultimate 
world population on this scheme would be very little higher. 
The low of 6,500 is based on mortalitv continuinq to fall and 
replacement (two children per couple surviving to maturity) 
ing reached by 1995; the high estimate assumes this condition 
will be reached by 2015. 
These numbers straddle the World Bank A figure, which is 
8,136 million for the year 2050, and our high is slightly below 
the United Nations low figure. The result agrees with the 
implications of Lester R. Brown's (1976) paper. It represents 
a growing consensus that if birth rates have not dropped to 
replacement early in the 21st century, then death rates will 
rise substantially. 
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POPULATION OF THE WORLD AND ITS REGIONS, 1975-2050 
INTRODUCTION 
The world popula t ion  i s  now pass ing  t h e  4 b i l l i o n  mark, 
and a t  t h e  p resen t  r a t e  of i n c r e a s e  it would double t w i c e  t o  
about 15 b i l l i o n  by t h e  year  2050. Y e t  t h e r e  a r e  t h o s e  who say 
t h a t  it has  a l r e a d y  reached a c e i l i n g  and w i l l  do w e l l  t o  main- 
t a i n  i t s  p r e s e n t  l e v e l ;  t h a t  sho r t ages  of a l l  k inds ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
of f o o d s t u f f s ,  w i l l  prevent  f u r t h e r  rise, even i f  b i r t h  c o n t r o l  
does  not .  Many i n d i v i d u a l s  a l r eady  born w i l l  be a l i v e  i n  t h e  
year  2050; it i s  hard ly  very  informat ive  t o  know t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  
be accompanied on t h e  e a r t h  by between 4 and 15 b i l l i o n  people.  
The fol lowing pages a r e  an a t tempt  t o  narrow t h e  range,  
The Future  i s  Uncerta in  
u n t i l  t h a t  f u t u r e  d a t e  a r r i v e s ,  any s ta tement  p r e d i c t i n g  
t h e  number of people  i n  t h e  world or any p a r t  of i t s  s u r f a c e  
i n  t h e  year  2050 i s  soothsaying.  The b e s t  t h a t  can be done is 
t o  narrow t h e  range somewhat, so t h a t  one does  no t  have t o  t a k e  
account of a l l  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  between 4 and 15 b i l l i o n ,  bu t  
on ly  of some of them. I f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o u t s i d e  7 t o  9 b i l -  
l i o n  could reasonably  be excluded, w e  would have m o s t  of t h e  
knowledge of t h e  2050 now poss ib l e .  
One way of l i m i t i n g  t h e  range i s  t o  accept  t h e  high,  med- 
i u m ,  and l o w  v a r i a n t s  of f u t u r e  popula t ion  a s  publ ished by t h e  
United Nations,  t h e  World Bank, t h e  United S t a t e s  Bureau of t h e  
Census, or some o t h e r  agency. Evalua t ion  of t h e s e  i s  not  easy.  
They a r e  based on e x t r a p o l a t i o n  of b i r t h  and d e a t h  r a t e s ,  and 
t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  i s  e l a b o r a t e  and complex enough t h a t  i ts  method 
i s  no t  e a s i l y  summarized. It w i l l  be w e l l  t o  compare them wi th  
some simple c a l c u l a t i o n s  t r a n s p a r e n t  enough f o r  immediate 
unders tanding and criticism. 
This paper w i l l  examine i n  what degree it is  poss ib le  t o  
put  bounds on t h e  f u t u r e .  W e  s h a l l  see, f o r  example, t h a t  t h e  
population of t h e  year 2000 cannot but  be c l o s e  t o  6 b i l l i o n ,  
say with 500 m i l l i o n  v a r i a t i o n  i n  e i t h e r  d i r e c t i o n ,  i f  major 
famines and wars a r e  avoided, and t h a t  t h e  2050 populat ion can 
f a l l  anywhere between 7 and 9 b i l l i o n .  The spreading horn 
t h a t  expresses  our  ignorance of t h e  f u t u r e  i s  determined by 
t h e  lesser uncer ta in ty- -a t  l e a s t  up t o  now--of dea th  r a t e -  than 
of b i r t h  r a t e s .  We can put  narrower bounds on how many of t h e  
p resen t ly  a l i v e  w i l l  survive  than  on how many new people w i l l  
be born. That i s  why t h e  horn spreads,  and why i t - i s  impos- 
s i b l e  t o  p e n e t r a t e  t h e  v e i l  of ignorance t h a t  s e p a r a t e s  9 from 
7 b i l l i o n .  
F i n a l l y  w e  w i l l  make our own p ro jec t ion  f o r  t h e  yea r s  t o  
2075. I t  w i l l  be a long t i m e  before it i s  known whether it is  
b e t t e r  than t h e  e x t a n t  p ro jec t ions ,  an uncer t a in ty  a l l  projec-  
t i o n s  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o .  
The D i f f i c u l t i e s  S t a r t  with t h e  Present  
Table 1 shows f o r  t h e  p a s t  and t h e  near f u t u r e  t h e  main 
f a c t s  of world population. During t h e  l a s t  q u a r t e r  of t h i s  
millenium populat ion a s  a whole i n c r e a s e s  about 8 t i m e s ,  popu- 
l a t i o n  i n  t h e  r i c h  coun t r i e s  about 6 t imes.  From t h e r e  being 
46 a c r e s  of t h e  land su r face  of t h e  p l a n e t  f o r  each of u s  i n  
1750, t h e r e  i s  t o  be only 6 a c r e s  i n  t h e  year 2000. When t h e  
p resen t ly  r i c h  c o u n t r i e s  were developing they  grew very 
r a p i d l y  and came t o  be 35 percent  of t h e  e a r t h ' s  population. 
The poor c o u n t r i e s  a r e  now more than  ca tching  up, and with 
78 percent  of t h e  p lane t  i n  t h e  year 2000 they  w i l l  have ex- 
ceeded t h e i r  propor t ion  i n  t h e  18th  century.  Inc reases  i n  t h e  
l a t t e r  p a r t  of t h e  20th century  a r e  unprecedented i n  h i s t o r y ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  inc rease  of t h e  poor c o u n t r i e s  a t  22 per  thou- 
sand. 
TOO much should not  be made of t h i s  comparison of r i c h  and 
poor based on p resen t  r a t e s .  Any competit ion between them has 
a very d i f f e r e n t  locus  from populat ion numbers. Both groups 
have g r e a t  impact on resources  and hence on car ry ing  capaci ty .  
A world populat ion t h a t  rises a t  18 per  thousand m u l t i p l i e s  
s i x f o l d  i n  a century.  I f  we p r o j e c t  t h e  r a t e s  f o r  t h e  poor 
(22 per  thousand) and t h e  r i c h  ( 9  per  thousand) s e p a r a t e l y  f o r  
t h e  following century  we f i n d  an even g r e a t e r  inc rease :  near ly  
7 1/2 t i m e s .  An es t ima te  of t h e  f u t u r e  always comes o u t  higher 
when executed by separa te  components than  pro jec ted  a s  a t o t a l  
only. 
But we can be su re  t h a t  t h i s  amount of inc rease  w i l l  not  
occur,  and i n  f a c t  t h e  United Nations medium es t ima te  of 6.2 
b i l l i o n  f o r  t h e  year  2000 i s  probably high. The r i c h  c o u n t r i e s  
a r e  bare ly  inc reas ing  a t  a l l ,  and t h e  poor c o u n t r i e s  have come 
t o  t a k e  b i r t h  c o n t r o l  se r ious ly .  That t h e  world t o t a l  i s  l i k e l y  
t o  be c l o s e  t o  6 b i l l i o n  by t h e  end of t h e  century w i l l  be 
shown below. 
Table 1 .  Summary of world populat ion over 2 5 0  yea r s .  
Number i n  m i l l i o n s  
1 7 5 0  1 8 0 0  1 8 5 0  1 9 0 0  19.5 0  2 0 0 0  
world 7 91 978 1 2 6 2  1 6 5 0  2501  6 2 5 3  
Rich c o u n t r i e s  2 0  1  248 347  573  857  1 3 6 1  
Poor c o u n t r i e s  590  7 3 0  91 5  1 0 7 7  1 6 4 4  4893  
Percent  d i v i s i o n  between r i c h  and poor c o u n t r i e s  
Rich c o u n t r i e s  2 6  26  28  3 5  34  2 2  
Poor c o u n t r i e s  7 4  7 4  7 2  6 5  66  7 8  
P e r  thousand annual i n c r e a s e  
To ta l  4 5  5  8  18  
Rich c o u n t r i e s  4 7 1 0  8  9 
Poor c o u n t r i e s  4 5  3 8 2 2  
Rich c o u n t r i e s  a r e  Europe, Northern America, temperate  South America, 
A u s t r a l i a ,  New Zealand, and Japan. 
Es t imates  f o r  1750-1  9 0 0  from Durand ( 1  9 6 7 )  ; 1950-2000  from t h e  United 
Nations ( 1  9 7 5 )  medium v a r i a n t .  
Even be fo re  s t a r t i n g  t o  p r o j e c t  t h e  f u t u r e  t h e  would-be fo re -  
c a s t e r  has  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  H i s  f i r s t  o b s t a c l e  i n  t h e  way of e s t ima t -  
i ng  what t h e  world popula t ion  w i l l  be i n  t h e  2 1 s t  cen tu ry  i s  
ignorance of i ts  presen t  amount and r a t e  of growth. A s  of  1 9 7 1  only  
1 0  percent  of t h e  popula t ion  of Af r i ca ,  6 percent  of t h e  popula t ion  
of Asia, and 2 0  percen t  of t h e  popula t ion  of South America w e r e  
covered by complete b i r t h  r e g i s t r a t i o n .  A t  t h a t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of 
completeness was a  modest one: t h a t  90  percen t  of b i r t h s  be 
r e g i s t e r e d .  
The seven l a r g e s t  c o u n t r i e s  a s  of now c o n s t i t u t e  58 percen t  of 
t h e  wor ld ' s  popula t ion  (Table 2 ) .  Their  t o t a l s  a t  t h e  jumping-off 
p o i n t  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  e r r o r s  of census-taking.  I n  t h e  case  of  t h e  
United S t a t e s  t h e  s h o r t f a l l  is  on t h e  o rde r  of 2 percen t ,  measured 
by c a r e f u l  re-enumeration. Other c o u n t r i e s  have less a c c u r a t e  cen- 
suses  and a r e  less consc ien t ious  i n  ca r ry ing  o u t  independent checks 
on enumeration. I n  some t h i s  may be o f f s e t  by t h e  b e t t e r  d i s c i p l i n e  
of t h e i r  popula t ions .  One can say on t h e  whole t h a t  t h e  numbers f o r  
1 9 7 0  i n  Table 2 a r e  reasonably accura t e ,  say  w e l l  w i t h i n  5 percen t ,  
bu t  China i s  a conspicuous except ion.  
Since China c o n t a i n s  between one f i f t h  and one q u a r t e r  of t h e  
wor ld ' s  popula t ion ,  i ts number and i n c r e a s e  a r e  of g r e a t  importance. 
The ~ n t e r n a t i o n a l  S t a t i s t i c a l  Programs Center of t h e  U . S .  Bureau of 
t h e  Census ( 1 9 7 6 )  g i v e s  843  m i l l i o n  f o r  mid-1975, an  i n c r e a s e  of 
1 2  m i l l i o n  from mid-1 974. A I D  (Ravenholt 1 9 7 6 )  g i v e s  7 m i l l i o n  in -  
c r e a s e  a t  one extreme, and John Aird i s  quoted a s  an a u t h o r i t y  by 
t h e  Environmental Fund ( 1 9 7 6 )  a t  t h e  o t h e r  extreme a s  e s t ima t ing  an 
annual i n c r e a s e  of 22  m i l l i o n .  The World Bank, quot ing  Chinese f i g -  
u r e s  communicated t o  t h e  World Populat ion Conference a t  Bucharest ,  
Table 2. Seven l a r g e s t  c o u n t r i e s  a s  es t imated  by t h e  United 
ÿ at ions ( 1  976, medium v a r i a n t )  and p ro jec t ed  t o  
t h e  yea r  2000 ( m i l l i o n s  of pe r sons ) .  
china 772 908 1031 1148 
Ind ia  543 694 87 6 1059 
U.S.S.R. 243 268 294 31 5 
United S t a t e s  205 224  247 264 
Indonesia 11 9 155 197 238 
Japan 104 118 126 133 
B r a z i l  95 126 166 2'1 3  ' ' ' ' 
g i v e s  786 m i l l i o n  a s  t h e  mid-1972 l e v e l ,  and a t  a  1.8 pe rcen t  
growth r a t e  China would be i n c r e a s i n g  a t  14 m i l l i o n  per  year .  
The United Nat ions has  772 m i l l i o n  f o r  1970 and 839 m i l l i o n  
f o r  1975, h igher  than  t h e  World Bank f i g u r e ,  a s  t h e  fol lowing 
i n t e r p o l a t i o n  shows: 
Popula t ion  Annual i n c r e a s e  
(mi l l ions1  ( m i l l i o n s )  
U.S. A I D  about  840 
U.S. Bureau of t h e  Census 807 
United Nat ions 798 
World Bank 786 
Environmental Fund 
The United Nations f i g u r e  appa ren t ly  inc ludes  ~ a i w a n  wi th  some 
15 m i l l i o n ,  and y e t  it i s  lower than  t h e  U.S. Bureau of t h e  
Census e s t ima te ,  which shows Taiwan a s  a  s e p a r a t e  e n t i t y .  
The U.S. A I D  e s t i m a t e  i s  provided by R.T. Ravenhold (1976) 
and is  pieced t o g e t h e r  from v a r i o u s  i t e m s  of r e c e n t  evidence,  
inc luding  correspondence wi th  Chinese o f f i c i a l s ,  t h a t  shows 
China 's  b i r t h  r a t e  t o  have dropped t o  14 p e r  thousand by 1975, 
t h e  l a r g e  drop being i n  t h e  1970s. The d e a t h  r a t e  i s  down t o  
6  p e r  thousand on t h i s  c a l c u l a t i o n .  I t  p u t s  t h e  l e v e l  of t h e  
Chinese popula t ion  a t  876 m i l l i o n  i n  1975, h igher  than  t h e  
o t h e r s ,  b u t  t h e  a b s o l u t e  annual i n c r e a s e  a t  on ly  7  m i l l i o n ,  
which i s  about  ha l f  of what has  been g e n e r a l l y  thought.  A d i f -  
f e rence  of  7  m i l l i o n  pe r  year  i n  China makes a  d i f f e r e n c e  t o  
t h e  Chinese and t h e  world popula t ion  by t h e  end of t h e  cen tu ry  
of 175 m i l l i o n .  Some r e s o l u t i o n  of t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  p l a i n l y  
requi red .  
Here and elsewhere t h e r e  a r e  s i g n s  t h a t  t h e  United Nat ions 
e s t i m a t e  i s  high,  t h a t  it has n o t  caught up wi th  r e c e n t  i nd ica -  
t i o n s  of f a l l i n g  b i r t h  r a t e s ,  One example i s  t h a t  t h e  F.R.G., 
t h e  G.D.R. and Aus t r i a ,  shown a s  inc reas ing  where i n  f a c t  t h e y  
have s t a r t e d  t o  decrease ,  The medium v a r i a n t  g i v e s  f o r  ~ u s t r i a  
a b i r t h  r a t e  of 14.8 a g a i n s t  a dea th  r a t e  of 1 2 . 4 .  I n  f a c t  
t h e  b i r t h s  a r e  we l l  below t h e  d e a t h s  f o r  1975. On t h e  o t h e r  
hand t h e  United Nations g i v e s  Niger ia  a popu la t ion  of 55 m i l -  
l i o n  i n  1970 and 63 m i l l i o n  i n  1975, whi le  t h e  World Bank 
g i v e s  it 70 m i l l i o n  i n  1972. United S t a t e s  b i r t h s  a r e  shown 
a t  16.2 per  thousand by t h e  United Nat ions  f o r  1970-75 and a t  
17.2 f o r  1975-80. While no one can now say  what t h e  quinquen- 
nium w i l l  average,  y e t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  12 months ending 
August 1976 show a d rop  t o  14.5 sugges t s  t h a t  t h e  17.2 i s  
hard ly  l i k e l y  t o  be a t t a i n e d .  
How F a s t  i s  t h e  World Popula t ion  Inc reas ing  Now? 
The U.S. Bureau of t h e  Census p u t s  t h e  t o t a l  f o r  mid-1975 
a t  3,996 m i l l i o n  and t h e  annual  growth r a t e  between 1.7 and 
1.9, which would make t h e  annual  increment 68 t o  76 m i l l i o n .  
The United Nations i s  a t  t h e  upper end of t h i s  i n  r e s p e c t  of 
n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e - - i t  g i v e s  18.7 f o r  1970-75 and 19.3 f o r  
1975-80, an  average of 19.0 per  thousand,  bu t  it a p p l i e s  it t o  
a sma l l e r  base ,  3,967 m i l l i o n  i n  1975, making t h e  increment 
75 m i l l i o n .  E s p e c i a l l y  t o  be noted i s  t h a t  t h i s  increment ac- 
cord ing  t o  t h e  United Nations medium v a r i a n t  goes  above 
101 m i l l i o n  i n  t h e  l a s t  f i v e  y e a r s  of t h e  cen tu ry .  
Once aga in  t h e  f i g u r e s  provided by R.T. Ravenholt and 
Bracke t t  (1976) of U.S.AID a r e  much lower. They f i n d  f o r  1974 
a world popula t ion  t o t a l  of 3,880 m i l l i o n  and a growth r a t e  of 
1.63 p e r c e n t ,  o r  an  increment of 63 m i l l i o n .  And f a r  from t h e  
increment being on t h e  rise, it i s  w e l l  p a s t  i t s  peak of 
70 m i l l i o n  reached i n  1970 and i s  now headed downward. 
The d i f f e r e n c e  from t h e  o f f i c i a l  UN and U.S.BC f i g u r e s  
i s  dramat ic .  For even i f  t h e r e  i s  no f u r t h e r  f a l l ,  and t h e  
f i g u r e  remains a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  63 m i l l i o n ,  by t h e  end of t h e  
cen tu ry  w e  w i l l  be 3880 + ( 6 3 ) ( 2 6 )  = 5518 m i l l i o n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  
t h e  6-plus b i l l i o n  t h a t  i s  found i n  o t h e r  e s t i m a t e s .  
The Peaking of t h e  R a t e o f  I n c r e a s e  
A l l  e s t i m a t e s  ag ree  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  t h e  r a t e  of i n c r e a s e  of 
world popula t ion  i s  pass ing  a maximum and s t a r t i n g  t o  d e c l i n e .  
The United Nat ions  p u t s  t h e  maximum a t  19.3 per  thousand,  and 
shows it a s  occu r r ing  i n  t h e  quinquennium 1975-80, which i s  t o  
s ay  a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  moment. The developed c o u n t r i e s  have been 
f a l l i n g  s i n c e  World War 11, whi le  t h e  less developed c o u n t r i e s  
a s  a whole r each  t h e i r  maximum of 23.6 i n  1975-80. The s e v e r a l  
c o n t i n e n t s  a r e  a l s o  reaching  maxima about  now, excep t  Af r i ca ,  
whose r a t e  of i n c r e a s e  keeps i n c r e a s i n g  u n t i l  1985-90, aga in  
according t o  t h e  UN medium v a r i a n t  (Table  3 ) .  
Table  3 .  Annual r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  p e r  thousand p o p u l a t i o n ,  1950-2000, 
United N a t i o n s  medium v a r i a n t ,  a s s e s s e d  i n  1973. 
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Developed developed Latin South 
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METHODS OF POPULATION ESTIMATION 
Geometric  I n c r e a s e  
S e t t i n g  t h e  1975 wor ld  p o p u l a t i o n  P1975 a t  4.0 b i l l i o n  and 
t a k i n g  a  r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  o f  1.8 p e r c e n t  p e r  y e a r ,  g i v e s  f o r  t h e  
y e a r  2000 
T h i s  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  l a t e s t  Uni ted  N a t i o n s  number f o r  t h e  y e a r  
2000, and below t h e  6.5 b i l l i o n  p r e s e n t e d  earl ier  f o r  t h a t  y e a r .  
Yet o n e  can  a r g u e  t h a t  it i s  a l m o s t  c e r t a i n l y  t o o  h igh .  
For t h e  p r e s e n t  rate o f  1.8 p e r c e n t '  p e r  y e a r  w i l l  go down. 
The t i m e  a b o u t  now a p p e a r s  a n  h i s t o r i c  h i g h  i n  t h e  ra te  of i n -  
c r e a s e  o f  world p o p u l a t i o n .  The r e a s o n  why t h e  rate o f  i n c r e a s e  
must f a l l  c a n  b e  s e e n  from t h e  r e a s o n  it h a s  r i s e n  up t o  now. 
The N e t  Reproduct ion  Ra te  R is  t h e  number of  c h i l d r e n  ex- 0  
p e c t e d  t o  be born  t o  a  g i r l  c h i l d  j u s t  b o r n ,  
1.5 - 
a - 
- 
0.5 - Developed 
Figure  1- Popula t ion  r a t e s  of i n c r e a s e ,  showing maximum now 
a t t a i n e d ,  United Nations. 
where !L(a) i s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  she  l i v e s  t o  age a ,  m(a)da  
t h e  chance t h a t  she then has a  c h i l d  before  age a  + da.  Ro i s  
t hus  t h e  r a t i o  of t h e  number l i v i n g  i n  one genera t ion  t o  t h e  
number l i v i n g  a  genera t ion  before ,  a s  implied by t h e  c u r r e n t  
r a t e s  of b i r t h  and dea th .  I f  d e a t h  i s  disregarded w e  have G 
t h e  Gross Reproduction R a t e ,  a s  t h e  same i n t e g r a l  wi th  t h e  0  , 
p r o b a b i l i t y  of su rv iv ing  R(a) omi t ted .  I f  R i s  t h e  r a t i o  of 0  
success ive  genera t ions  a t  t h e  given r a t e s  of b i r t h  and d e a t h ,  
then  G i s  t h e  expected fami ly  s i z e  of su rv ivors  a t  t h e  given 0  
b i r t h  r a t e s .  
Then i f  w e  w r i t e  
t h e  f i r s t  f a c t o r  on t h e  r i g h t  i s  t h e  s u i t a b l y  weighted prob- 
a b i l i t y  of s u r v i v a l  t o  ma tu r i ty ,  t h e  second f a c t o r  Go i s  a  
pure f e r t i l i t y  i n d i c a t o r .  Up t o  now t h e  main change - for  many 
c o u n t r i e s  has  been t h e  f a l l  i n  t h e  f i r s t  f a c t o r ,  su rv ivorsh ip ,  
while  t h e  second f a c t o r ,  f e r t i l i t y ,  has  remained cons tan t  o r  
f a l l e n  slowly. T h e  su rv ivorsh ip  cannot go above u n i t y ,  and f u r -  
t h e r  d e c l i n e s  i n  mor ta l i ty- - those  p a s t  ch i ldbea r ing  ages--make 
no g r e a t  d i f f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  r a t e  of i n c r e a s e .  The r i c h  c o u n t r i e s  
have a t t a i n e d  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  of s u r v i v o r s h i p  t o  ma tu r i ty  of about  
0.97; t h e  poor ones of about 0.90, except  i n  Afr ica .  A s  t h e  l i m i t  
of u n i t y  i s  approached t h e  r a t e  of i n c r e a s e  of su rv ivorsh ip  i s  
bound t o  slow down. Any i n c r e a s e  i n  su rv ivorsh ip  beyond t h e  1970s 
i s  almost c e r t a i n  t o  be o f f s e t  by a  g r e a t e r  f a l l  i n  f e r t i l i t y .  
This  i s  shown i n  Figure  1 ,  taken  from United Nations d a t a .  
The conclus ion  i s  t h a t  p r o j e c t i n g  t h e  1975 popula t ion  a t  
t h e  1.8 pe rcen t  per  year  now shown, producing 6 . 2  m i l l i o n  by 
2000, must be an overs ta tement .  L e t  u s  see what happens i f  w e  
suppose a  f a l l  i n  t h e  r a t e  of i nc rease .  
Declining Rate of Inc rease  
For d e a l i n g  wi th  changing r a t e s  of i n c r e a s e  w e  need an e x a -  
p res s ion  t h a t  conver t s  t h e  t r a j e c t o r y  r ( t )  of t h e  r a t e  of in-  
c r e a s e  i n t o  a  t r a j e c t o r y  of t h e  populat ion.  The d e f i n i t i o n  of 
dP ( t )  , and hence of r ( t )  i s  - P ( t )  d t  
t 
I n  P ( t )  = r (u.) du + cons tan t  , I 
0 
s o  t h e r e f o r e  t 
P ( t )  = Poexp( r ( u ) d u )  . I 
0 
U s e  t h i s  t o  see what t h e  u l t i m a t e  world popula t ion  would 
be i f  t h e  r a t e  of i n c r e a s e  dec l ined  i n  a  s t r a i g h t  l i n e  t o  zero  
by t h e  year  2050, s t a r t i n g  a t  1.8 percent  i n  1975. By t h e  end 
of t h e  century  t h e  r a t e  would be 1 . 2  percen t ,  by 2025 it would 
be 0.6 percent .  The popula t ion  a t  each p o i n t  of time would be 
Apparently t h e  popula t ion  i n  t h e  year  2000 would be 5.8, and 
t o t a l  subsequent i n c r e a s e  f o r  a l l  t ime would be only a  f u r t h e r  
2 b i l l i o n .  
I f  every th ing  i s  a s  above, e x c e p t * t h a t  t h e  r a t e  of i n c r e a s e  
drops  t o  zero  by t h e  year  2025, w e  have lower f i g u r e s :  
s o  t h e  u l t i m a t e  popula t ion  i s  on ly  6.3 b i l l i o n .  
Number 
l l  Time 
Figure  2. A s t y l i z e d  v e r s i o n  of t h e  demographic 
t r a n s i t i o n .  
Breakdown i n t o  D C s  and LDCs 
How much d i f f e r e n c e  does  it make i f  w e  break t h i s  down i n t o  
more and less developed c o u n t r i e s  ( D C s  and LDCs)? Any such 
d i v i s i o n  w i l l  r a i s e  t h e  r e s u l t .  I f  t h e  drop  t o  s t a t i o n a r i t y  by 
t h e  yea r  2050 s t a r t s  w i t h  t h e  DCs i n c r e a s i n g  a t  0.7 p e r c e n t  and 
t h e  LDCs a t  2.4 p e r c e n t ,  w e  have i n  b i l l i o n s  
Now t h e  u l t i m a t e  s t a t i o n a r y  world popu la t ion  i s  8.6 b i l l i o n .  
Recognizing heterogeneous subgroups h a s  r a i s e d  t h e  outcome by 
0.7 b i l l i o n .  
Demographic T r a n s i t i o n  
A s  a  f u r t h e r  approach,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  demographic t r a n s i t i o n ,  
i n  which i n  count ry  a f t e r  coun t ry  m o r t a l i t y  f a l l s  and t h i s  i s  
fol lowed a f t e r  a  l onge r  o r  s h o r t e r  t i m e  by a  f a l l  i n  f e r t i l i t y  
(F igu re  2 ) .  Between t i m e  t and t i m e l  t h e  d e a t h  r a t e  d  goes  0  
from da  t o  dl and t h e  b i r t h  r a t e  from bo t o  bl . C a l l  A t h e  
a r e a  b  b  d  d  i n  F i g u r e  2. Then by v i r t u e  of ( I ) ,  s i n c e  0 1 1 0  
r ( t )  = b ( t )  - d ( t )  i s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between b i r t h s  and d e a t h s ,  
and 
t h e n  Pl = P eA shows t h e  i n c r e a s e  from p o p u l a t i o n  Po a t  to t o  0 
popu la t ion  P1 a t  tl . Thi s  i s  e x a c t  and does  n o t  depend on t h e  
s i m i l a r i t y  of t h e  f a l l  of b i r t h s  and d e a t h s .  But now l e t  t h e  
b i r t h  and d e a t h  cu rves  f a l l  i n  s i m i l a r  manner, s o  t h a t  b ( t )  i s  
j u s t  d ( t )  d i s p l a c e d  t o  t h e  r i g h t .  L e t  L be  t h e  l a g  i n  t h e  f a l l  
o f  b i r t h s  behind t h e  f a l l  i n  d e a t h s ,  and R be t h e  common range  
LR 
of b i r t h  and d e a t h .  Then P1 = Poe . ~f t h e  l a g  L i s  20 y e a r s  
on t h e  average  and R = 0.03, w e  have 
Po = 4.0e 2 0 ( 0 * 0 3 )  = 7.3 b i l l i o n s .  
Le t  u s  d i s a g g r e g a t e  i n t o  less and more developed.  Suppose 
30 p e r c e n t  f u r t h e r  i n c r e a s e  f o r  t h e  developed,  and 30 y e a r s '  l a g  
i n  t h e  demographic t r a n s i t i o n  of  t h e  less developed.  Then 
D C s  1.1 x 1.3  = 1 . 4  
LDCs 
T o t a l  8.5  b i l l i o n s ,  
o r  abou t  t h e  same a s  t h e  d i s a g g r e g a t e d  v e r s i o n  w i t h  r a t e  of  i n -  
c r e a s e  r ( t )  f a l l i n g  i n  a s t r a i g h t  l i n e  t o  2050. Recent demo- 
g r a p h i c  t r a n s i t i o n s  have t a k e n  p l a c e  more r a p i d l y  t h a n  e a r l y  
ones ,  and i f  t h i s  c o n t i n u e s  t o  be t r u e  30 y e a r s  is  an  upper  
bound f o r  t h e  f u t u r e .  
The P r i n c i p l e  of !.lome n turn 
The above h a s  t a k e n  l i t t l e  account  of age.  Desp i t e  ex- 
per iment ing  t h a t  showed t h a t  p r o j e c t i o n s  w i thou t  age  came 
e q u a l l y  c l o s e  t o  t h e  t r u e  number t h a t  emerged 10 o r  1 5  y e a r s  
l a t e r ,  one ought  n o n e t h e l e s s  t o  examine t h e  e f f e c t  of  momentum 
due t o  age  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  be ing  f a v o r a b l e  t o  b i r t h s  fo l lowing  a 
long  p e r i o d  of h igh  f e r t i l i t y .  I f  a  c o u n t r y  d r o p s  t o  z e r o  f e r -  
t i l i t y  a t  a  moment when i t s  b i r t h  r a t e  i s  b, i t s  e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  
l i f e  go , i t s  r a t e  of i n c r e a s e  r ,  and i t s  mean age  of  c h i l d b e a r -  
i n g  p, t h e n  t h e  r a t i o  of i t s  u l t i m a t e  s t a t i o n a r y  p o p u l a t i o n  t o  
t h a t  a t  t h e  moment of f a l l  i s  
or if b = 0.040, do = 60, Ro = 2.5, we have the ratio 1.52. 
If the less developed countries increase for an average of 
20 years at an average rate of 2.4 percent, then drop to bare 
replacement, their population will be 
Adding 1.4 for the developed countries gives 7.1 + 1.4 = 8.5 
billions. 
Stationarity 
The number of births in the United States has been just 
over 3 million during this decade despite a very large cohort 
of women of childbearing age, themselves the outcome of cohorts 
of over 4 million during the 1950s. As the number of childbear- 
ing couples begins to taper off in the 1980s we can expect some 
fall in the number of births. But this may not occur; it is 
possible that the falling off in the number of persons of child- 
bearing age will be offset in some degree by an increased 
average family size, though no one can be sure. On the other 
hand there are still some unwanted births, and these are certain 
to be reduced both through better contraceptive methods (a once- 
a-month pill for women and a pill for men would help) and 
through better dissemination of existing methods. If 3 million 
turns out to be the level of births in the United States, and if 
the expectation of life for the average of both sexes climbs to 
75 years, then the long-run stationary population of the United 
States will be exactly the product of these two, or 225 million. 
Similar calculation cai be made for other countries whose 
birth levels have fallen nearly to stationarity, which is to say, 
in the long run just offsetting deaths. In F.R.G. and in Austria 
the current births are fewer than current deaths. If the births 
in the F.R.G. rise to 700,000 and continue at that level, and are 
associated with an expectation of life of 75 years, the resulting 
stationary population would be 52.5 million, or 10 million fewer 
than are now present. 
For Europe and the Soviet Union as a whole the corresponding 
level for births may well be on the order of 12 million per year. 
This would correspond to a total population of 12 x 75 = 800 mil- 
lions, against the 728 millions shown for 1975 by the U.S. Bureau 
of the Census. 
Adding the 3 million births of the United States, 2 million 
for Japan, 12 million for Europe and the U.S.S.R., 1 million for 
Canada, Australia, etc., gives i9 million births per year for 
the developed countries. The ultimate stationary population to 
which these point is 1,350 million. This compares with 1,132 
million estimated for the same developed countries for mid-1975 
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. It says they have less than 
20 percent more to climb before they reach their permanent high. 
That some such relatively low ultimate total seems likely is 
argued in detail below. Calculations of this kind, that can be 
done on the back of an envelope, have the advantage of being im- 
mediately understandable and therefore subject to critical 
judgment . 
HOW ACCURATELY CAN THE FUTURE BE KNOWN? 
serious projections provide a range for any future date, 
and the succession of ranges fans out as one goes forward in 
time. The fan or horn takes its characteristic shape from the 
fact that survivorship among the living population has, at least 
in the past, followed a clear trend, while births are subject to 
such large fluctuations that the trend is hard to separate out. 
As the projection goes forward in time the births subsequent to 
the jumping-off point make up a larger and larger part of the 
population. By the year 2000 more than one half of the world 
population will have been born since 1975, by the year 2025 
nearly 80 percent. It is on the number of these births that the 
main effort of the forecast must be centered. 
As an example of the fan estimated long enough ago that we 
can now form some judgment as to where the performance will lie 
within it, consider Table 4, showing United Nations estimates 
made in 1968. The gradually widening range ends with a low of 
just under 6 billion and a high of just over 7 billion for the 
year 2000. It now appears that the low figure is closer to the 
mark. Births in both developed and less developed countries 
fell faster than was anticipated by extrapolation of pre-1968 
trends. The 1963 assessment was probably more accurate than 
that.of 1968--its low was 5,449 million and its high 6,994 mil- 
lion. Besides being more accurate in having the wider range 
stretching much further on the low side, the 1963 estimate was 
more modest in allowing a wider range, which is to say, a wider 
allowance for ignorance. 
The range--somewhat over 1.1 billion between low and high 
or 10 percent each way from the mean in 1968, and 1.5 hillion 
or 12 percent in 1963--reflects correctly the accuracy with 
which such estimates can be made, if one wishes to have a one- 
half to two-thirds chance of straddling the true figure. 
In recent years the United ,Nations has stressed the medium 
variant of its estimates, tending to neglect the high and low 
variants. This is what many of its customers want--the best 
guess than can be made on each future year, so that they can 
use the figure without thinking too much about it. Yet the 
Table 4. The fan of uncertainty as assessed by the United Nations in 1968 (millions of persons). 
High variant Medium variant Low variant 
Less Less Less 
developed Developed developed Developed developed Developed 
Date countries countries Total countries countries Total countries countries Total 
Table 5. Zstimates of 1980 world population (millions of per- 
sons) ; from United Nations, various dates. 
Date Low lled i urn High 
Table 6. United Ylations medium variant of population in the 
year 2000 as assessed at various dates (millions). 
Assessed in World More developed Less developed 
range is a way of informing the customer as to how much he can 
rely on the medium variant, and its partial abandonment must be 
reckoned as a step backward. 
Table 5 shows the 1980 population as estimated at various 
times from 195i to 1973. The first estimates were much too low, 
and successive estimates kept rising to a peak, reached in 1968, 
when 1980 was estimated at 4,457 million persons. Since then 
the United Nations revision has been downwards. It is more than 
possible that the lower 1973 figure will also prove high. It is 
understandable that forecasters should change their numbers as 
new data keep appearing, and that they should be influenced by 
such facts as the trend towards acceptance of contraception in 
developing countries. 
As a rough way of describing the uncertainty fan, the high 
estimate of Table 4 supposes an average 2.7 percent per year in- 
crease for the less developed countries, and the low estimate 
2.0 percent. This range could well prove too narrow to have a 
two-thirds probability of straddling the number that will be 
counted in 1980. The U.S. Bureau of the Census, estimating the 
year 2000 in 1974, shows an average annual increase of 1.17 per- 
cent for the high variant and 0.55 percent for the low. This 
also could prove too narrow. 
The forecaster is in a dilemma. He wants to be useful to 
his client, yet he is aware that forecasting is difficult. If 
he gives a realistic range for 2/3 confidence the client would 
scorn his numbers, even though no better numbers are to be had. 
Table 7. Estimates of world population to the year 2050 from 
three publications (millions of persons). 
Source 1975 2000 2025 2050 
United Nations, with 
data up to 
World Bank (1972) 
Projection A 
Projection B 
High 
Medium 
LOW 
High 
Medium 3968 6254 
Low 
Frejka (1973) 
Bare replacement by 
One can obtain some impression of the degree to which 
further data influence the forecast by studying successive re- 
visions, for example as these affect developed and less de- 
veloped countries in Table 6. 
EXISTING FORECASTS BY REGION 
Few serious published estimates are available for the 21st 
century, even for the world as a whole, and fewer yet are to be 
had by regions. some of these are shown in Table 7. 
The United Nations estimates ,stop at the year 2000. The 
World Bank (1972) goes much farther. Its work is based on an 
early version of the Frejka (1973) projections, the main contri- 
bution of the Bank being selection of two of the Frejka projec- 
tions that may be considered realistic. The low estimate, 
called A, supposes that the average of fertility in the world 
will drop linearly to bare replacement by 2000-2005, and the 
high estimate B supposes that this condition will not be 
reached until 2040-45. 
The World Bank Projection A gives population in the year 
2000 as 5,916 million and in 2050 as 8,136 million. It will 
later be argued that this is a reasonable medium figure. The 
Bank contrasts it with Projection B, that gives the 2000 
Table 8. Groups of countries as assembled for projection, with 
mid-1975 population as estimated by the U.S. Bureau of 
the Census (thousands of persons). 
United States and countries 
of British settlement 
United States 213,631 
Canada 22,811 
South Africa 25,087 
Australia 13,520 
New Zealand 3,096 
Total 278,145 
Socialist countries of 
eastern Europe, in- 
cluding the U.S.S.R. 
Albania 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
German Democratic 
Republic 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
U.S.S.R. 
Yugoslavia 
Total 384,295 
Petroleum exporters 
Algeria 
Ecuador 
Gabon 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Kuwait 
Nigeria 63,022 
Saudi Arabia 6,231 
Venezuela 12,821 
Total .294,146 
Developing countries-- 
incomes of more than 
$400 GNP per capita 
in 1972 
Argentina 25,911 
Barbados 232 
Brazil 106,976 
Chile 10,585 
Republic of China 16,076 
Colombia 25,185 
Costa Rica 1,967 
Cuba 9,252 
Dominican Republic 4,907 
Fiji 575 
Guatemala 6,047 
Guyana 786 
Hong Kong 4,339 
Israel 3,437 
Jamaica 2,065 
Lebanon 2,656 
Malaysia 12,368 
Mexico 59,238 
Nicaragua 2,260 
Panama 1,674 
Peru 15,486 
Singapore 2,251 
Trinidad 974 
Uruguay 3,059 
Total 321,OOG 
population as 6,690 million and the 2050 as 13,444 million. The 
ultimate stationary world population, reached about 2100, is nearly 
double on Projection B what it is on Projection A: 15,815 million 
against 8,386 million, but this is beyond our scope. 
The 2050 figure designated A increases from 1975 at an average 
rate of 0.95 percent per year, while B increases at 1.62 percent 
per year. 
For our purposes it is convenient to recognize six groups of 
countries. These are shown in Table 8, and may be summarized as 
Table 9.  Summary of c a t e g o r i e s  of c o u n t r i e s  recognized f o r  pur- 
poses of t h e  p r e s e n t  p r o j e c t i o n ,  from U.S. Bureau of 
t h e  Census ( m i l l i o n s  of p e r s o n s ) .  
- - -- 
World 
United S t a t e s  and c o u n t r i e s  of B r i t i s h  s e t t l e m e n t  276 
Western Europe and Japan 463 
S o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s  of  e a s t e r n  Europe, i nc lud ing  
t h e  U.S.S.R. 
O i l  e x p o r t e r s  294  
Developing c o u n t r i e s  of more than  $400 GNP p e r  
c a p i t a  i n  1972 
Less developed c o u n t r i e s  of less than  $400 GNP 
p e r  c a p i t a  i n  1972 2249 
A l l  of t h e s e  groups bu t  t h e  l a s t ,  which i s  r e s i d u a l ,  a r e  l i s t e d  
i n  some d e t a i l  i n  Table 8. 
i n  Table 9 with  1975 t o t a l s  i n  m i l l i o n s  a s  g iven  by t h e  
U.S. Bureau of t h e  Census. 
THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
I n  t r a d i t i o n a l  s o c i e t i e s ,  f o r  example t h o s e  of A f r i c a  on 
which John Caldwell  (1976) h a s  g e n e r a l i z e d ,  t h e  f low o f  weal th  
was from young t o  o l d  a s  long  a s  t h e  o l d  l i v e d ;  on ly  a t  t h e  mo- 
ment of d e a t h  d i d  t h e  accumulated weal th  r e v e r t  t o  t h e  young. 
With modernizat ion t h e  f low of weal th  i s  r eve r sed ;  t h e  young a r e  
r a i s e d  and educated by t h e  o l d  and have no o b l i g a t i o n s  a f t e r  
ma tu r i ty .  This  i s  f u n c t i o n a l  f o r  dynamic s o c i e t i e s ,  i n  which 
t h e  independence of t h e  young f i t s  wel l - - inher i tance  i s  unimpor- 
t a n t  f o r  them. But combined w i t h  t h e  l o s s  by t h e  fami ly  of i t s  
product ive  a c t i v i t i e s ,  t h i s  r e v e r s a l  of t h e  flow of  wea l th  r e -  
moves a n c i e n t  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  have any c h i l d r e n .  It  a c t s  i n  t h e  
same d i r e c t i o n  a s  t h e  weakening of  fami ly  s o l i d a r i t y ,  evidenced 
by a  h igh  frequency of d ivo rce .  
Divorce has  inc reased  e s p e c i a l l y  du r ing  t h e  p a s t  decade.  
I n  t h e  United S t a t e s  d i v o r c e s  numbered 264,000 i n  1940, r o s e  
g e n t l y  and somewhat i r r e g u l a r l y  t o  479,000 by 1965, t h e n  jumped 
t o  708,000 i n  1970 and t o  970,000 by 1974. A t  f i r s t  it seemed 
t h a t  t h e  war and i t s  a f t e r m a t h  were caus ing  t h e  i n c r e a s e ,  bu t  
appa ren t ly  t h e  cause  i s  more b a s i c .  
A t  one t i m e  t h e  f ami ly ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  t h e  middle and upper 
c l a s s e s ,  was he ld  t o g e t h e r  by t h e  p rope r ty  t h a t  it shared .  I n  
a l l  c l a s s e s  it was h e l d  t o g e t h e r  by men having s o  g r e a t  an  advan- 
t a g e  i n  t h e  l a b o r  market  t h a t  a woman w a s  b e t t e r  o f f  s h a r i n g  a  
man's income t h a n  hav ing  t h e  whole of  any income s h e  c o u l d  inde- 
pendent ly  earn .  Mores and l a w s  made d i v o r c e  d i f f i c u l t ;  d ivo rced  
persons  were regarded  as somewhat t a i n t e d .  And a s  an  a s p e c t  of 
t h e  c i r c u l a r i t y  t h a t  p r e v a i l s  i n  such matters, t h e  f a m i l y  w a s  
he ld  t o g e t h e r  by t h e  many c h i l d r e n  t h a t  it had. A l l  of  t h e s e  
t h i n g s  have changed d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  g e n e r a t i o n ,  and t h e y  seein t o  
have changed e s p e c i a l l y  r a p i d l y  between t h e  1960s and 1970s.  
The prominence o f  d i v o r c e  a s  a p o s s i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  minds of 
coup le s  acts  as a brake  on c h i l d b e a r i n g .  I f  t h e r e  i s  even a 
chance t h a t  t h e  coup le  w i l l  break up, t h e y  d o  n o t  want c h i l d r e n .  
Having cus tody  of  a c h i l d  i s  a handicap t o  e i t h e r  p a r t n e r  
e q u a l l y  f o r  work and f o r  remarr iage .  
Women now d e r i v e  t h e i r  i d e n t i t y  i n  l a r g e  p a r t  from t h e i r  
j obs ,  j u s t  a s  men have a lways done. The f r a c t i o n  of mar r i ed  
women i n  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  r o s e  from 22.0 p e r c e n t  i n  1948 t o  40.8 
p e r c e n t  i n  1970; among t h o s e  w i th  c h i l d r e n  under 6  y e a r s  of  age  
t h e  rise was even s teeper-- f rom 10.8 p e r c e n t  t o  30.3. Over t h e  
l o n g e r  t e r m  numbers are provided by t h e  censuses ;  of women 25-44 
y e a r s  of age o n l y  15.1  p e r c e n t  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  
i n  1890, and 47.5 p e r c e n t  by 1970. 
E f f e c t i v e  e q u a l i t y  f o r  women i s  an  a s p i r a t i o n  r a t h e r  t hen  
an  achievement. Average wages f o r  men i n  1974 w e r e  $204 p e r  
week, and f o r  women $124, t a k i n g  f u l l - t i m e  workers  i n  a l l  i n -  
d u s t r i e s  and occupa t ions  t o g e t h e r .  Whatever t h e  breakdown, it 
seems t h a t  men e a r n  abou t  50 p e r c e n t  more t h a n  women, a r a t i o  
t h a t  changes v e r y  l i t t l e  as one goes  back th rough  time t o  t h e  
1920s,  when average  e a r n i n g s  f o r  men w e r e  $0.55 p e r  hour ,  and 
f o r  women $0.36. The s ta t i s t ics  show e i t h e r  t h a t  women a r e  da- 
i n g  d i f f e r e n t  and less s k i l l e d  work t h a n  men o r  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  
pa id  less f o r  t h e  same work; p robably  b o t h  a r e  t r u e .  When jobs  
l i k e  bank t e l l e r ,  once sex-typed a s  m a l e  and now i n  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
p a r t  performed by women, make t h e  changeover t h e y  change t h e i r  
c h a r a c t e r  and,  one s u s p e c t s ,  r e l a t i v e  pay goes  down. Sex-typing 
is u n i v e r s a l ;  t h e r e  a r e  n o t  many k inds  of  work t h a t  a r e  i n d i f -  
f e r e n t l y  performed by men and by women. What i s  d e f i n e d  a s  
women's work v a r i e s  ove r  p l a c e  a s  w e l l  a s  o v e r  t i m e .  I n  t h e  
U.S.S.R. women can  become p h y s i c i a n s ,  and t h e  m a j o r i t y  of  phys i -  
c i a n s  a r e  indeed women, which seemingly f a v o r s  e q u a l i t y ,  excep t  
t h a t  p h y s i c i a n s  a r e  p a i d  a  sma l l  f r a c t i o n  of what t h e y  r e c e i v e  
i n  America. But whether  e q u a l  de  f a c t o  o r  n o t ,  t h a t  women seek  
e q u a l i t y ,  and seek  c a r e e r s  such a s  men have,  it c l e a r . 1 ~  asso-  
c i a t e d  wi th  sma l l  f a m i l i e s .  I t  might be  t h a t  t h e  d i s i n c l i n a t i o n  
t o  have c h i l d r e n  i s  what makes women seek  jobs ,  o r  t h e  i n t e r e s t  
i n  jobs  causes  them t o  r e f r a i n  from having c h i l d r e n ;  b u t  whatever 
t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  i s  h igh .  There 
seems l i t t l e  d i s t i n c t i o n  on t h i s  between s o c i a l i s t  and c a p i t a l i s t  
s o c i e t i e s .  
I t  i s  worth  r e p e a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  c h i l d b e a r i n g  de- 
pends on t h e  a s p i r a t i o n  of women t o  e q u a l i t y  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  
achievement of  e q u a l i t y .  When a  couple  b reaks  up r emar r i age  i s  
far more difficult for the women, partly for the demographic 
reason that male mortality is higher, In the united States pri- 
mary individuals, defined as household heads living alone or 
with non-relatives only, included in 1970 7,882,000 women and 
only 4,063,000 men, While age differences between parties to 
first marriages are small, on their second marriage men tend to 
find younger women, and in a society in which youth is desirable 
this is in itself a sign of male dominance. 
We are dealing here with a complex of apparently insepara- 
ble factors. The acceptability of divorce is associated with 
increased equality for women in the labor market; the labor 
market activities of women are associated with their wish to 
have fewer children; their having fewer children makes it easier 
for couples to break up. That complex by which women aspire to 
be like men, in that they attain their identity through a job 
or career rather than through their position in the family, 
causes them to value their time in monetary terms, and so child- 
ren become expensive. This contrasts with earlier times when 
children were a primary value and going out to work, even if 
opportunity offered, would have seemed too costly in terms of 
the children who would have to be sacrificed for it. 
All this is superimposed on, and carries to an extreme, 
those characteristics of the family that are congruent with in- 
dustrial society. On the one hand it has given up the produc- 
tion of most commodities and even services to outside agencies, 
so that the education, clothing, even feeding of the children is 
a cost in the family's external balance of payments, and on the 
other hand it does not have any way of putting its children. 
to work in producinq anything usuful to itself or salable to 
child while young, not to mention the fact that he could not be 
put to work before the age of about 20 for lack of skills. 
The operative question for prediction of fertility is the 
durability of the social trends above described. Some judgment 
is required on whether divorce, women's liberation, easy contra- 
ception and abortion, and other present conditions conducing to 
low fertility are permanent or transient. ~luch of what has been 
said above, after all, is rationalization after the fact of a 
falling birth rate. If a rise in the birth rate were to occur 
it would be explained as due to the reassertion of the durable 
values of the family against the materialism and immorality of 
the early 1970s. Most writers, however, find it difficult to 
imagine such a reversal. 
Distinguishing Fluctuations from Trends 
In developed countries fertility has come to be subject to 
the business cycle, and fluctuates with employment and earnings 
prospects. Such fluctuations make very tenuous any conclusions 
drawn from single months. U.S. births for August 1976 at 
277,000 are distinctly down from births in August 1975, which 
were 288,000. Comparing the 8 months ended in August we have 
2,067,000 in 1976 against 2,099,000 in 1975, again a drop. 
Comparing t h e  y e a r  ended August w e  f i n d  f o r  1976 3,117,000 
a g a i n s t  3,206,000 f o r  1975. A s  a  r a t i o  t o  popu la t ion  t h e  f a l l  
is p r o p o r t i o n a l l y  g r e a t e r ,  s i n c e  t h e  popu la t ion  had been i n c r e a s -  
i ng  somewhat ove r  t h e  t i m e :  
1973 15.2 p e r  thousand 
1974 14.8 p e r  thousand 
1975 15.1 per  thousand 
1976 14.5 p e r  thousand 
a l l  f a r  t h e  12 months ended August. 
Note t h a t  t h e s e  r a t e s  a r e  much below t h e  low of t h e  1930s,  
which came i n  1933 w i t h  18.4 b i r t h s  pe r  thousand popula t ion .  
Taking account  of  age d i s t r i b u t i o n  would make r e c e n t  f i g -  
u r e s  s t and  o u t  even more. Now i s  when t h e  baby boom b a b i e s  a r e  
a t  t h e  h e i g h t  o f  t h e i r  reproduct ion .  The peak of  postwar b i r t h s  
having come i n  1961, w e  can expec t  t h e  number of p o t e n t i a l  
mothers t o  s t a r t  d e c l i n i n g  soon. 
A q u e s t i o n  more impor tan t  numer ica l ly  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e  of  
world popu la t ion  i s  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  same causes  of f e r -  
t i l i t y  r e d u c t i o n  w i l l  occur  i n  less i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  s o c i e t i e s .  
W e  cannot  expec t  q u i t e  t h e  same p a t t e r n ,  and it appea r s  indeed 
t h a t  some ve ry  d i f f e r e n t  f o r c e s  a r e  o p e r a t i n g .  To t h e s e  w e  now 
t u r n .  
THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
What speed of d e c l i n e  of t h e  c rude  r a t e  of  n a t u r a l  i n -  
c r e a s e  can  poor c o u n t r i e s  r e a l i s t i c a l l y  expec t?  This  above a l l  
w i l l  determine  t h e  world popu la t ion  i n  t h e  21s t  cen tu ry .  What 
kind of ev idence  w i l l  permi t  a  f o r e c a s t  of  t h e  d e c l i n e ?  
Costa Rica has  been c i t e d  a s  a  h o r r o r  s t o r y  of r a p i d  i n -  
c r e a s e ,  and s t i l l  i s  by w r i t e r s  who have n o t  looked a t  t h e  num- 
b e r s  r e c e n t l y .  Despi te  p r o s p e r i t y ,  i t s  r a t e  of i n c r e a s e  was 
over  3.5 p e r c e n t  pe r  y e a r  i n t o  t h e  1960s. But t h e n  i t s  b i r t h  
r a t e  f e l l  from 4 4 . 9  t o  37.3 pe r  thousand popu la t ion  i n  1960-65; 
a t  t h e  same t i m e  i t s  d e a t h  r a t e  f e l l  from 9.2 t o  7.3. The n e t  
outcome was a  f a l l  i n  t h e  r a t e  of n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e  from 35.6 t o  
30.0, o r  somewhat more t h a n  1 p e r  thousand per  yea r .  By 1974 
i t s  r a t e  of i n c r e a s e  was down t o  24 p e r  thousand,  w i th  b i r t h s  a t  
28 and d e a t h s  a t  5. I f  b i r t h s  w e r e  t o  f a l l  a t  1 per  thousand pe r  
year  it would t a k e  o n l y  about  15  y e a r s  t o  r each  s t a t i o n a r i t y ,  f o r  
i t s  crude  d e a t h  r a t e  would r ise a s  i t s  r a t e  of i n c r e a s e  slowed. 
Costa R i c a ' s  f a l l  i n  t h e  1960s was no t  by any means a  r eco rd .  
I n  t h e  20 y e a r s  from 1954 t o  1974 S ingapore ' s  r a t e  of i n c r e a s e  
dropped from 4.5 . p e r c e n t  t o  1 . 4 ,  Hong Kong's from 3.0 pe rcen t  
t o  1.1 i n  t h e  decade of t h e  1960s. 
But f o r  each such c a s e  t h e r e  i s  more than  one i n  which t h e  
b i r t h  r a t e  i s  e i t h e r  s tubborn ly  high o r  else i t s  f a l l  i s  matched 
by t h a t  of  t h e  d e a t h  r a t e .  I n d i a ' s  b i r t h s  f e l l  from 4 4  t o  4 0  
per  thousand d u r i n g  t h e  1960s,  bu t  i t s  d e a t h s  f e l l  from 20 t o  16 ,  
and about  t h e  same seems t o  be t r u e  of Indones ia .  S ince  it i s  
t h e  l a r g e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  most ly  determine t h e  t o t a l s  f o r  t h e  
less developed world ,  and t h e  i n c r e a s e  of t h e s e  i s  g e n t l y  r i s i n g  
t o  a  ( f o r e c a s t )  peak i n  1975-80, fol lowed by a  g e n t l e  d e c l i n e  t o  
t h e  end of t h e  c e n t u r y  of l i t t l e  more t h a n  1 p o i n t  p e r  thousan? 
i n  each 5  y e a r s ,  acco rd ing  t o  t h e  United Nat ions ,  it could  t a k e  
75 y e a r s  f o r  t h e  poor  c o u n t r i e s  a s  a  whole t o  r e a c h  s t a t i o n a r i t y .  
R e l a t i o n  of  M o r t a l i t y  and F e r t i l i t y  
AS among c o n t i n e n t s  and c o u n t r i e s ,  t h o s e  i n  which t h e  b i r t h  
r a t e  i s  h igh  t end  t o  be t h o s e  w i t h  h igh  d e a t h  r a t e s .  Rates  pe r  
thousand f o r  1970-75, a s  e s t ima ted  by t h e  t lni ted Nat ions ,  a r e  
Natura l  
B i r t h s  Deaths i n c r e a s e  
Af r i ca  46.3 19.8 26.5 
L a t i n  America 36.9 9.2 27.7 
South Asia 4 1  . 9 16.7 25.2 
Western South Asia  42.8 14.3 28.6 
Less developed r e g i o n s  37.5 14.3 23.2 
These a r e a s  a r e  a t  ve ry  d i f f e r e n t  s t a g e s  of economic and s a n i -  
t a r y  p r o g r e s s ,  y e t  t h e i r  r a t e s  of i n c r e a s e  a r e  s i m i l a r .  A f r i c a ' s  
d e a t h  r a t e s  a t  10 p e r  thousand h i g h e r  t h a n  L a t i n  America 's ,  and 
s o  a r e  i t s  b i r t h  r a t e s .  For how long i n t o  t h e  f u t u r e  can  b i r t h  
and d e a t h  r a t e s  f a l l  t o g e t h e r ,  so  t h a t  popu la t ion  growth con- 
t i n u e s  a t  i t s  p r e s e n t  r a p i d  pace? 
The e x p e c t a t i o n  of  l i f e  f o r  A f r i c a  was e s t ima ted  a t  36.1 
y e a r s  f o r  1950-55, and it seems t o  have r i s e n  a lmost  i / 2  a  year  
p e r  year  u n t i l  1970-75, when it i s  e s t i m a t e d  a t  45.0 y e a r s .  
While t h i s  may s e e m  low i n  p r e s e n t  American terms, it i s  w e l l  
t o  n o t e  t h a t  a t  t h e  beginning of t h e  20 th  c e n t u r y  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  e x p e c t a t i o n  of l i f e  was 47.3 y e a r s .  South Asia  shows 
48.5, a  l e v e l  a t t a i n e d  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  a f t e r  1900. L a t i n  
America a t  61.0 i s  doing  b e t t e r  t h a n  t h e  United S t a t e s  u n t i l  
t h e  e a r l y  1930s. 
Y e t  p a r a l l e l  t r e n d s  of  b i r t h  and d e a t h  r a t e s  cannot  con t inue ,  
and even i f  t hey  d i d  t h e  r a t e  of i n c r e a s e  would slow down. The 
r a t e  of i n c r e a s e  of e x p e c t a t i o n  seems t o  p r e s s  a g a i n s t  a  c e i l i n g  
a t  about  75 y e a r s  f o r  females .  With o r  wi thout  such  a  c e i l i n g ,  
t h e  f r a c t i o n  of c h i l d r e n  t h a t  p a s s  r e p r o d u c t i v e  age cones  t o  ex- 
ceed 0.9 a s  f o r  females  pas ses  70, and s o  cannot  r ise  much 0 
0 
OQ) 
Probability of Surviving to Age 50 ( e 50 ) 
Figure  3 .  P r o b a b i l i t y  of s u r v i v i n g  t o  age  50 a g a i n s t  
e x p e c t a t i o n  of l i f e ,  females ,  c o u n t r i e s  of  
Europe, Asia and L a t i n  America. 
more even i f  e x p e c t a t i o n  of l i f e  c o n t i n u e s  upward. F igu re  3 
shows t h a t  k50  , t h e  chance of s u r v i v i n g  t o  age 50, goes  up 
more o r  less i n  a  s t r a i g h t  l i n e  wi th  go , and t h e n  i s  fo rced  t o  
bend s h a r p l y .  
Empir ica l  Evidence on F e r t i l i t y  
S ince  complete s t a t i s t i c s  a r e  no t  t o  be had,  w e  mu.st depend 
on f ragmentary items of ev idence  now coming t o  l i g h t  t o  judge 
what t h e  b i r t h  r a t e  i n  t h e  Thi rd  World i s  doing.  Some of t h e s e  
i t e m s  sugges t  t h a t  it has  s t a r t e d  a  p r e c i p i t o u s  d e c l i n e .  
Under t h e  World F e r t i l i t y  Swrvey  haila and has  c a r r i e d  o u t  a  
r e t r o s p e c t i v e  survey ,  s o  f a r  n o t  r e l e a s e d  by t h e  government. 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  f i g u r e s  from t h a t  survey show f o r  t h e  t o t a l  f e r t i l i t y  
r a t e  (approximate ly  t h e  number of c h i l d r e n  t h a t  would be born t o  
s u r v i v i n g  women i f  t h e  c u r r e n t  b i r t h  r a t e s  cont inued)  
The rapid fall in the 1970s contrasts with the slow decline of 
the 1960s. 
In Indonesia a United Nations-supported vital registration 
experiment used a dual record system in 10 areas, spread widely 
through Bali and East Java, though not a proper random sample. 
The result was a total fertility rate of 3.3, while Central Java 
showed 3.7; meanwhile Sumatra, where no birth control has been 
promoted and where the rates have always been higher, showed 
over 6. As among the 10 places a reassuring correlation appears 
between family planning activities and the fall of the birth rate. 
In the Philippines Father Madigan of Xavier University has 
carried out surveys in a rural part of Mindanao during 1971-75 
He found that the birth rate, as high as 45 per thousand in 1972, 
had fallen to 30 in 1975. Also in the Philippines, 7 provinces 
are being studied by a team that includes Father Madigan, 
Mercedes Concepcion of the University of the Philippines in 
Manila, and Father Wilhelm Flieger at San Carlos University in 
Cebu. Their preliminary figures show a significant downtrend 
during the 1970s. 
In Colombia the 1973 census had a question on date of birth 
of the youngest child, and if the child was born in the preced- 
ing 12 months questions were asked to ensure complete returns. 
The outcome seems to be a crude birth rate of about 33 per thou- 
sand, which is-about 10 per thousand lower than was found in 
the 1960s. 
The Demographic Transition 
The demographic transition is the process by which high 
death rates and high birth rates give way to low rates. In 
Paul Demeny's (1968) lapidary expression: "In traditional so- 
cieties, fertility and mortality are high. In modern societies, 
fertility and mortality are low. In between, there is demo- 
graphic transition." Taking for granted that the transition 
either has gone to completion or will do so in every country, 
the important question is by how many years the fall in births 
will follow the fall in deaths. If it is 10 years the popula- 
tion will typically increase by about one third; if it is 100 
years the increase will be 20-fold. Thus our objective of nar- 
rowing the range.of possibilities for the 21st century is not 
helped by the general concept of a demographic transition; it . 
would be greatly helped by any evidence on the time interval be- 
tween the fall in deaths and that in births. 
Several items of evidence do bear on the matter. As men- 
tioned earlier the more recent the transition the more quickly 
it takes place. The slopes of the lines representing birth and 
death rates are more sharply downward, and the birth curve seems 
to lag less behind the death curve. The matter has been studied 
by Father Wilhelm Flieger (1967). In Sweden births fell long 
after those in ~ritain, and in the years 1900-30 fell by 13.68 
per thousand population; births in England and Wales dropped by 
8.13 per thousand in 1870-1900 and by 10.35 in 1900-30. The 
evidence is not altogether unambiguous, but on the whole the 
numbers encourage us to think that future transitions will take 
place more quickly. 
This would follow if the transition is closely tied to the 
rate of economic expansion, for this takes place more rapidly 
now than it did in the past. Rates of economic advance of 6 and 
8 percent per year, recently exceeded by Japan and Brazil, are 
common today, whereas 2 or 3 percent per year was doing well in 
the 19th century. 
The attitudes of elites and publics to birth control are 
changing quickly. During the 1960s the attitudes in many poor 
countries were reminiscent of that of France in the early 20th 
century when she was in military-demographic competition with 
Germany. Latin American newspapers, reported on by Joseph Stycos, 
saw contraception as against religion and harmful to the future 
of their country. They surpassed themselves in rhetoric concern- 
ing Unites States assistance in birth control, contending that 
American imperialists were envious of their demographic vigor 
and were attempting genocide through the pill and the IUD. Such 
rhetorical overkill was heard on all continents. 
Echeverria became president of rlexico in 1970 on a pro- 
natalist platform. He promised to populate the country, to fill 
its empty spaces. But within three years of assuming power he 
removed pre-existing bans on birth control and gave up all refer- 
ence to empty spaces. In Mexico as elsewhere in the 1970s the 
notion of population as a weapon has been quietly interred and 
birth control is being actively disseminated. India is proceed- 
ing to compulsory sterilization. Americans and Swedes on family- 
planning missions find doors open to them nearly everywhere. 
Why has the old policy been reversed? 
The first reason is urbanization. As rural areas have 
filled and climbed up on their food supplies, movement to the 
cities has accelerated. The growth of cities in the poor coun- 
tries not only dominates the statistics, but is the dominant im- 
pression of every visitor to countries from Indonesia to Egynt 
to Brazil. Peasants who could be hungry in a distant countryside 
without causing a ripple now become a genuine problem to their 
elites, for overpopulation no longer takes the form of the shar- 
ing of poverty and patient malnutrition, but threatens political 
action in the capital itself. Echeverria observed that the 
increments of population do not go out to pioneer in the jungle, 
undertake homesteading, or build with their own hands irrigation 
projects in the dry areas, but prefer rather to come to llexico 
City and make themselves the problem of their government. He 
suddenly realized that he had overpopulation on his hands, a 
realization duplicated by governments around the world. 
The abruptness of the move into the cities is increased by 
a feature of the drop in mortality, which fell suddenly in many 
countries in the early 1950s. The effect was similar to that of 
a baby boom as far as survivors into their twenties about the 
present time are concerned. The effect is particularly striking 
Table 10. Age d i s t r i b u t i o n  of E a s t e r n  South A s i a  f o r  1975, 
Uni ted Nat ions  (1976) . 
Popu la t ion  
i n  
Age thousands Di f f e r ence  
i n  E a s t e r n  South As ia ,  whose ages  a r e  g iven  f o r  bo th  s e x e s  t o -  
g e t h e r  i n  1975 i n  Tab le  10.  The d r o p  i n  f i r s t  d i f f e r e n c e s  a f t e r  
age  2 5  needs no u n d e r l i n i n g .  T h i s  m a t t e r  is  compl ica ted  by 
United Nat ions  r e g i o n a l  numbers a r e  based,  and t h e  e f f e c t  does  
n o t  appear  c l e a r l y  i n  e i t h e r  A f r i c a  o r  L a t i n  America. But where 
it does  appear  it must have p o l i t i c a l  consequences:  l a r g e  youth  
c o h o r t s ,  b e t t e r  educa ted  than  t h e i r  p a r e n t s ,  of  an age and d i s -  
p o s i t i o n  t o  m i g r a t e  t o  c i t i e s ,  a r e  bound t o  e x e r t  p r e s s u r e s  t h a t  
w i l l  n o t  accord  wi th  t h e  p o l i c i e s  of  t h e i r  s e n i o r s  i n  power. 
Some u r b a n i z a t i o n  was o c c u r r i n g  i n  t h e  1960s and d i d  n o t  
cause  changes of  p o l i c y  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of  b i r t h  c o n t r o l .  The 
popu la t ion  problem was p r e s e n t  a l l  a long ,  bu t  i n  some a s p e c t s  
was e f f e c t i v e l y  concealed by conces s iona ry  s a l e s  of Uni ted S t a t e s  
g r a i n .  Bv an  unspoken co inc idence  of o b j e c t i v e s  between t h e  
U.S. cong;ess and t h e  e l i t e s  of  poor c o u n t r i e s ,  s u r p l u s  q r a i n  
w a s  shipped and r e c e i v e d  abroad.  o f t e n  pa id  f o r  i n  rupees  
and r u p i a h s  w i t h  t h e  promise t h a t  t h e  payee would never  spend 
t h e  paper  money. Such t r a n s a c t i o n s  w e r e  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  g i f t s ,  
and t h e i r  amounts were s u b s t a n t i a l .  
In the mid-1960s India received United States grain at a 
rate of over .lo million metric tons of grain per year--at 440 
pounds per person it was enough to provide for 50 million people, 
principally i'n the port cities. This local availability of 
grain, along with an internal pricing policy that lowered prices 
at the farm, accelerated rural-urban migration. It seemed impos- 
sible to administer the imported grain to help the people already 
in the cities without drawing more people. 
This process concealed the population problem at the same 
time that it aggravated it. But the concealment ended sharply 
in 1973 with the exhaustion of U.S. surpluses. Henceforth grain 
had to be paid for, and because the same process of population 
increase was occurring in Burma, Thailand, and other former ex- 
porting countries, the number of suppliers on the world market 
sharply declined. Grain prices rose to $250 per ton and higher. 
The population problem became visible as it was directly 
translated into cash terms. If a shortage occurred, so that the 
last 10 percent of the population had to be provided for by pur- 
chases on the world market, then India would have to lay out 
something like $2.5 billion. To see the magnitude of this in 
Indian terms, one has only to note that total exports in 1973 
were $2.9 billion. Since exports are a gross figure, including 
the re-export of some imports, one can say that, in default of 
local production, the marginal 10 percent of population would 
require all of India's import capacity. 
Exports of the F.R.G. in the same year 1973 were valued at 
$69 billion; she could have fed her population luxuriously on 
imported foodstuffs without seriously interfering with her other 
imports. This aspect of the population problem need be of no 
concern to developed countries, but nonetheless an undercurrent 
of worry ran through British economics, even when British in- 
dustry was ahead of all others, about whether it would always be 
possible to trade coal and steel for grain. What, some econo- 
mists persisted in asking, if countries that supplied Britain 
with its food, especially the United States, themselves indus- 
trialized? How then would Britain be able to feed its 30 mil- 
lion people? 
The main point is that urbanization, with its political and 
economic consequences, now reveals to governments throughout the 
Third World the nature of the population problem, and they are 
taking action. Since reproduction is an intimate matter, no one 
knows how effective their action will be. France, trying in the 
opposite direction, did not have much success in raising her 
birth rate. But governments are not powerless to make what is 
dear to the country come to seem dear to the individual family. 
They have a wide range of positive and negative incentives. One 
must suppose that their new realization of the problem will show 
in an accelerated fall of birth rates. 
These somewhat general considerations will now be trans- 
lated into specific projections. 
A GENERAL METHOD AND COMPUTER PROGRAM 
P r o j e c t i n g  t h e  Components 
To determine f u t u r e  m o r t a l i t y  w e  work from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
some c o u n t r i e s  have a g a i n  of almost one yea r  i n  f o r  each 0 
ca l enda r  y e a r  t h a t  goes  by. This  does n o t  mean t h a t  t h e i r  
c i t i z e n s  w i l l  l i v e  f o r e v e r ,  s i n c e  most of t h e  i n c r e a s e  i s  due 
t o  improvements a t  t h e  youngest  ages ,  which w i l l  have t o  s t o p  
somewhere be fo re  m o r t a l i t y  ze ro  i s  reached. 
TO begin wi th  t h e  percentage  d e c r e a s e  of 5Mx . t h e  age- 
s p e c i f i c  d e a t h  r a t e ,  w e  recognize  t h a t  such d e c r e a s e  cannot  
p o s s i b l y  be a s  g r e a t  a t  t h e  o l d e r  ages  a s  a t .  t h e  younger ones ,  
and a t  t h e  v e r y  o l d e s t  ages  it seems t o  f a l l  t o  zero.  For t h e  
youngest ages  a 15  p e r c e n t  f a l l  p e r  5 y e a r s  seems a r easonab le  
average over  a v a r i e t y  of  t i m e s  and p l a c e s ;  suppose f o r  age  x 
X 
w e  c a l l  t h e  f a l l  0 .15(1 - m) a s  a f r a c t i o n  of 5Mx . 
But w e  need t o  a d j u s t  f o r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  h igher  t h e  ex- 
p e c t a t i o n  of l i f e  t h e  s m a l l e r  t h e  r a t e  of f a l l .  Thus t h e  h i s -  
t o r i c a l  record  sugges t s  t h a t  t h e  d e c l i n e  of  m o r t a l i t y  under 
p r e s e n t  medical  c o n d i t i o n s  may be approaching ze ro  when w e  a r e  
up t o  age  75, and be t h r e e  t i m e s  as r a p i d  a t  = 45 a s  a t  0 
= 65. This  would be allowed f o r  by apply ing  t h e  f a c t o r  0 
(75 - e ) /20  t o  t h e  preceding.  0 
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  r a t e  of f a l l  is  more r a p i d  t h e  more r e c e n t l y  
it occurs .  Europe ' s  f a l l  i n  t h e  1 9 t h  c e n t u r y  was slower t h a n  
t o d a y ' s ,  i f  f o r  no o t h e r  reason  t h a n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  a n t i -  
b i o t i c s .  A rough way of a l lowing  f o r  t h i s  i s  t o  app ly  t h e  
f a c t o r  (t  - 1800/100, where t i s  t h e  c a l e n d a r  yea r .  
P u t t i n g  a l l  t h i s  t o g e t h e r  g i v e s  f o r  t h e  f r a c t i o n a l  d e c r e a s e  
i n  t h e  a g e - s p e c i f i c  M a t  l a s t  b i r t h d a y  t h e  q u a n t i t y  
n x 
where t h e  i n i t i a l  p r o j e c t i o n  i s ' f r o m  t h e  c a l e n d a r  yea r  t - 5 t o  
t,  and t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  of l i f e  a t  ca l enda r  yea r  t - 5 i s  ; 0 
Thus i f  t h e  p r o j e c t i o n  from t i m e  t - 5 t o  t was by a l i f e  t a b l e  
based on M 
n x '  
t h a t  from t i m e  t t o  t i m e  t + 5 would be based on 
One could implement t h i s  by r e c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  l i f e  t a b l e  i n  
each c y c l e  of p r o j e c t i o n ,  o r  else approximately by modifying 
/ L 5Lx+5 5 x t a k i n g  it t o  t h e  power 1 - . 6 :  
I n  f a c t  no u n i v e r s a l  formula such a s  t h e  above can be found 
t h a t  w i l l  provide  a good f i t  t o  a l l  t imes  and p l a c e s .  The most 
t h a t  can be s a i d  f o r  it i s  t h a t  it t a k e s  account  of some main 
v a r i a b l e s ,  t h a t  it i s  s u i t e d  t o  computation wi th  no need f o r  
t h e  o p e r a t o r  t o  make ad hoe  adjus tments ,  and most impor t an t ,  
t h a t  it i s  an e x p l i c i t  set of assumptions t h a t  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  
crit icism and improvement. The commodity may n o t  be v e r y  good, 
bu t  a t  l e a s t  t h e  consumer can know e x a c t l y  what he i s  g e t t i n g .  
For f e r t i l i t y  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r e  even g r e a t e r ,  and v a r i a -  
t i o n s  i n  t h e  assumptions make even more d i f f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  r e s u l t .  
But suppose w e  assume t h a t  a l l  popu la t ions  w i l l  be down t o  ba re  
replacement by t h e  end.of t h e  c e n t u r y ,  and t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  drop  
i n  a s t r a i g h t  l i n e .  I f  t h e  l a s t  pe r iod  f o r  which d a t a  a r e  t o  be 
had i s  1970-75, t h i s  means t h a t  w e  must a r r ange  f i v e  d r o p s  i n  
f e r t i l i t y ,  t o  t h e  f i n a l  c o n d i t i o n  i n  which t h e  N e t  Reproduction 
Rate  Rg i s  u n i t y .  Th i s  l a s t  i s  ar ranged  by s e t t i n g  t h e  r a t e s  a t  
each age equal  t o  Fx/R and t h e  i n t e r m e d i a t e  a g e - s p e c i f i c  r a t e s  0 
4 1 3 2 
a t  F (-- + -) , F (- + -), etc .  
x 5  5R0 x 5  5R0 
But w e  know t h a t  t h e  f a l l  i s  g r e a t e r  a t  t h e  o l d e s t  ages .  
A f a c t o r  t h a t  a l lows  f o r  t h i s  i s  x/30, which can  be a p p l i e d  t o  
each age ,  a t  t h e  c o s t  of  r e q u i r i n g  i t e r a t i o n  i f  t h e  p o i n t  of  
replacement i s  t o  be e x a c t l y  t h e  i n t e r v a l  1995-2000. I t  would 
be b e t t e r  t o  have t h e  r a t e s  drop  s lowly a t  f i r s t ,  then  more 
r a p i d l y ,  t hen  s lowly aga in .  
Migrat ion i s  a r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  f r a c t i o n  f o r  t h e  l a r g e  
popu la t ions  of Asia.  Europe has  had some in-migra t ion ,  b u t  it 
i s  o f f s e t  by out -migra t ion  t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  and elsewhere.  
The one a r e a  where mig ra t ion  makes an a p p r e c i a b l e  n e t  d i f f e r e n c e  
i s  Northern America and Oceania, where i t s  t o t a l  has  reached a s  
h igh  a s  a m i l l i o n  p e r  yea r .  
Program f o r  L i f e  Table and Popula t ion  P r o j e c t i o n  
The program t h a t  follrl>ws.in Table  12 ,  w r i t t e n  i n  FORTYAN I V ,  
provides  an e s t i m a t e  of f u t u r e  popu la t ion ,  f o r  males and females 
s e p a r a t e l y ,  i n  f ive -yea r  i n t e r v a l s ,  f o r  100 y e a r s .  The age  i n -  
t e r v a l s  can be condensed; males and females added; t h e  p e r i o d  of 
p r o j e c t i o n  lenqthened o r  shor tened .  (For Tzble  1 2 ,  s e e  paqe 3 1 .  ) 
Table 11. Less Developed Countries projected to 2050 by sex, 
assuming declining mortality and fertility dorm to 
bare replacement by 1995 (Low estimate) and by 2015 
(High estimate), millions of persons. 
Other Other 
LDCs LDCs 
> $400 > $400 
Oil income income Total 
exporters per head* per head LDCs 
Low estimate 
1975 
~4a 1e 143.6 162.5 1134.1 1440.2 
Female 144.7 161.9 1089.4 1396.0 
Total 288.3 324.4 2223.5 2836.2 
2000 
Male 208.2 229.5 1613.3 2051.0 
Female 215.4 232.5 1584.7 2032.6 
Total 423.6 462.0 3198 .O 4083.6 
2025 
Male 248.4 272.9 1909.3 2430.6 
Female 262.2 281.2 1916.6 2460.0 
Total 510.6 554.1 3825.9 4890.6 
2050 
Male 256.4 280.9 1976.7 2514.0 
Female 275.5 292.9 2017.1 2585.5 
Total 531.9 573.8 3993.8 5099.5 
High estimate 
1975 
Male 143.6 162.5 1134.1 1440.2 
Female 144.7 161.9 1089.4 1396.0 
Total 288.3 324.4 2223.5 2836.2 
2000 
Male 246.0 250.0 1909.3 2405.3 
Female 252.7 252.3 1874.9 2379.9 
Total 498.7 502.3 3784.2 4785.2 
2025 
Male 330.2 316.7 2526.3 3173.2 
Female 341.8 322.2 2525.6 3189.6 
Total 672.0 638.9 5051.9 6362.8 
2050 
Male 371.1 342.6 2839.6 3553.3 
Female 389.5 351.6 2890.1 3631.2 
Total 760.6 694.2 5729.7 7184.5 
*24 countries listed in report of November 26, 1976. 
The changes in mortality and fertility that are assumed 
follow simple rules, the same for all populations. For mortal- 
ity the fall takes place at a pace that is more rapid the lower 
the initial expectation of life, the later the calendar year, 
and the younger the age. For fertility the fall is taken to be 
proportional at all ages, and to drop to bare replacement in 20, 
30, and 40 years, these giving low, medium, and high variants of 
the future population. (Details in the memorandum of 
November 26, 1976, Population of the World and Its Regions, 
1975-2050.) The program is applicable without modification to 
any population, and preliminary experimenting shows it toq fit 
reasonably well to the changes in mortality and fertility that 
have occurred in the past. 
Input to the program consists of the population, deaths, 
and births of the jumping-off time, in our first application 
mid-1975. Five-year age groups, with 0 and 1-4 at last birthday 
shown separately and 85 and over as a single item, are the input 
categories. In this case the deaths are for 1970-4. Births are 
for both sexes together, in five-year intervals of age of mother. 
The input cards are divided into 8-column fields, and are 
as follows: 
Card 1 Females, population 0, 1-5, 5-9, ..., 40-44, 
in columns 1-8, 9-16, 17-24, etc. 
Card 2 Females, population 45-49, 50-54, ..., 85+, 
in columns 1-8, 1-18, ..., and total of all 
ages in columns 73-80 
Cards 3 and 4 Same for deaths 
Cards 5 and 6 Description of data set 
Card 7 Jumping-off year, in columns 1-4 
Card 8 Number of 5-year periods of projection required 
columns 1-2 
Card 9 Sex ratio at birth, typically 1.05, in columns 
1-4 
Cards 10 and 11 Number of births to women of each age, 
using same fields as for population and deaths, 
i.i., ages 15-19 ..., in columns 33-40, etc. 
Cards 12-20 Same for males, except without birth cards 
Preceding all these data cards is a single card giving the 
number of 5-year cycles to replacement, punched in column 8. 
Population, Deaths, and Births by Age 
The United Nations compilations of current data are the 
best available, and we used them for population, deaths, and 
births. These gave five-year age intervals up to age 80, and 
we wanted 0 and 1-4 at last birthday, as well as 80-84 and 85 
and over, at least for making the life table, though not for 
the projection. To make a rough allowance for the trend of 
births, the 0 was calculated by first finding the ratio of the 
5-9 to the 0-4; then taking the fifth root of this, say X, then 
5 calculating (1 - X)/(l - X ) as the fraction of the under 5 to 
call under 1. To split the 80 and over (_PaO), we took Sp70' 
and calculated 
Having exposed population of these ages for males and fe- 
males separately we then took the expectation of life for the 
given sex and population group as provided by the United Nations, 
and used the age-specific death rates of the corresponding model 
life table of the Coale and Demeny (1966) West set. These were 
multiplied by the population to estimate the number of deaths. 
Table 12. FORTRAN program for projection, programmed by 
Gary Littman. 
+OaTPAN 1 V  G I  R E L E A 5 r  2 . 0  . MAIN R A T 7  = 76365 L'*/3T/ 7 5  
3 
) ) ) I  nrn:rlslr lv PI 1 9 1 r ~ U I  19) . n c ( l o I  , r q l ~ ~ $ )  , ~ F L ~ I ~ ~ . I L . Z I , ~  ( L ~ I , @ I L _ ~ I . -  
~ A I ~ I S ~ T I ~ ~ T ~ % ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ P ~ ~ T I ~ O ~ I ~ ~ ~ I ! I I ; ~ F * ~ ( ~ L ~ ~ L J  
2,PPSl 4121 r3!- -  
3002 I N T F G ~ R  S T A ~ T , ~  - - 
C rduu 1 s  THF * ~ I ~ N P C P  q f  r l v f  Y F ~ P  P ~ P I ~ I ~ ;  I I ~ I T  11 P F P L  A I ' ~ Y F F I T  
* t FFl tT l l  I ~ Y  I S  Z I P A ~ H E ~ )  PLUS llNF 
000 3 R F I D  (5,3151 Nllv 
1-173rmRRATm) -- -- -- - - 
000 5 00 1000 lcnpb ' r  11 O -  - 
0006 6 0  3 1 )  Mf = I , , ?  
0007 00 300 UOUNI=l ,NU!4 
0008 C A L L - L ~ F F  Z P . A L , C P ~ , K ~ U ~ T , ~ ~ L , ~ N , F I  
)Ill - -  T'4F =WF 
001 2 T = r * l  l 7 5 . + 5 . * l Z . - T R F I i ~ F I  11172E. 
0 0  13 I F  lI.LT.3.)) T=J. 
3614 DO 300 I =  1, l l  
-- 
0015 CPL $1 I .KnUNr vMF1 = C P C I I )  
T Y l 6  
- - 
I F  11-21 301*302,303 
0017 301  J=O 
- 3,G - - - - - 0018 
q 002 3 300 OELII)=T*.15~l1.-.Jl*FLUATIJ1~ 
. .  . 
3 3 2 4  .- 310 CAl L PPOJ (Pr I IL,CP15,FFH,RF' ,NUK STACT,Z ,  S ; P P S I  
0025 1300 CONTINUE 
a ) . J i b  '- - . - - . . ' - . ' .. .-.. . - .  . . 
0 02 7 E NO 
-- ---- 
.. - 
P' 1 , 4 o 1 , ~ 1 3 ) . n ~ 1 9 1 . n ~ ~ 1 l q 1  ... 
0 0 0  3 UFd1.R T d H L c I 3 1  
0 0 1 4  D F I L + R  T I  T L V 4  1 
p c T A ~ L F  AFln l l l L F  ~ A V E  9FFt I  I )F?I~.~~FP T:! A l . 1 1 ~  THF ( IS"  
C SICF CHCllCF I N  L IAFL I .1~1C 
_L_IFE 149LE. ,u!-LV!.4\ITl0'4 
C l f - t l l b T r d @ l ~  R E  115~1) h S  AN I Y l T l t I  T I I L F  L I K r  ' L I F ~ ' " - - '  
- C T I R L E  F[rR:*, dN0 T I T L T  P F - U S € r !  I i )  luOIC.ArF T!IF NATIIqC 
. . .  5 r)f TIIF D A T ~ .  
. - 0 0 9 5  . . .  INTEGER I7.P 
r~ 0006  ' 16 ( ~ r u N i . C ; i . l j  Cltj-~t i 
~-~ 
0 0 0  7 REAO ( 5 , 1 1 1  ( P ( l l r l = l , l O 1  --- ----- 
0 0 0 0  R E A P  r5 .111  ( r ( 1 1 , 1 = 1 1 , 1 9 1  
- 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . .  . 1?19..- -. . -~ 9EAD. (_S-.l!! t?(!!!!31~_!0? 
0 0  1 0  RCAII ( 5 , 1 1 1  I O ( l l t l ~ l l ~ l ? I  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . .  o o ~ ~ - - -  . r! z o _ ~ n q ~ - ! ! o ~ 8 - 1 .  - ..... .- . 
3312  ncl 1 1=1119  
- 0 0  1 3  P I  I 1  * P I I l *  1 0 0 0  -- 
0 0 1 4  OELt  11-0. 
a 
. P.O.!I I . ~ ! ! . L ! L I F L O ~ T ( D I  1 1  ) / F L O b T ( P (  111 
0 0 1 6  4 DO 25 I l L r 1 9  
.... ... . ................ . . ...... ,117 _25b~!-l~.b_CC(IJ+(I.-OE~ ( 1) 1 - - - - - - -. 
a 0 0 1  8 6 L (  11=100000.  
-. 0 0 1 9  -- -. A(11=.07*1.7*AM111 
0 0 2 0  A(21=1.5 
a A(31=2!5 O O Z L  - .. ... .. .. ... ... -. ... . - - .- -. -- - - -  
'I 12 2 Y (  11=  L 
) r (21=4  0 0 2  3 - -. . - - . .. . ........-.. ..... . - . .  ........ - -. -. - - - -- - -. 
* 0 0 2 4  N ( 3 1 = 5  
0 0 2  5 DO 7 I = l r 3  
0 0 2 6  AL t  1 * 1 1 = A L ( I  1*(1-A(  I ) * A H (  1 1 ) / ~ 1 * ~ V ~ I l - A ~  I11*5Mf 118 
. .  0 2  7 _2.-C_9C(.L1r.US.UC--A-L_(I2-I-!LL_A_-~-!I .. .. . 
0 0 2 8  D i l  2 I ~ 4 r l 7  
. OOZ9 &--A.L( €*1J~_4UII*EYPI=PW.k*5.-~.~A-?~.!! 12!I--?).!*ldt4 (.I !.IL . -- 
a 1-4M( l -111 /  ( 4 8 * P (  I 1 1  1 
> I 3 1  AL( 19)=AL(  131;:FXP(-5*bN(181+5*(P( 1 6 1 - + * P ( 1 7 1 ~ 1 R ) )  
1*1AM( 161-4*AP( 171*3*dM( I 8 1  8 / ( 4 A * 0 (  18118 
. . .  '. > ) 3 1 .  ...... 3-194,18 ................. . -  . . . . . .  - . 
3 0 3 2  3 C P L ~ 1 1 = 5 ~ ~ b L ~ I 1 - A L ~ 1 * 1 ~ 1 * ~ 1 * 5 * ( A ~ ~ 1 + 1 1 - A ~ ~ 1 - 1 1 1 / 2 4 1 /  
.... i a ~ n ~ u ~ ! !  ) I A C ~ _ ~ _ + ~ ) I  .... . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  
8 0 0 3 3  CPI 1191=AL(  191 /AM( 1 9 1  
0 0 3 4  TiJT=O.O - 
313s on a 1=1.19 
. Q036- - .... .-a. --10raT?I+_C 
- - -- 
- 
. - . . - - . - - . . . . .  ... 
0 0 3  7 E ( l ) = r n T / A L I 1 1  
. 0 0 3 8 .  .................. 0 0  9 1 *2*  1 9 _ - .  ... - . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  
e 0 0 3 9  Q ~ I - l 1 = l - A L ~ l ) / J L ~ l - l 1  
P O *  0 TflT=TOT-CPL( I- 1) 
...... - . - - . - . -- - ... 
0 0 4  1 9 F f l 1 - ~ O T / A L ( I l  
0 
. 2 . . .  Q ? l 9 ) = l . .  ............ . . 
0 0 4  3 I F  ('RINT .CT .I I Gfl ~ f i  2%
- 3 1 4 4  PFA@(5 ,211  TEPLF 
1145  2 )  FPRMATOA81 
0 0 4 6  P T E ( ~ , z ~ I  T A R L F  - -- - 
b . _)/4!_- - - - _  -. i?,--, F r I P M A T ( ' l '  ,////////'I/' ' ,45X,3b!1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  
0 0 4 8  T 5 , 2 2  
0 0 4 9  odr o- '- - . . . .  22 FnPWAT f 4 A 8  1 ........ 
. . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  - J9 l T E ,  b;.z31 TLE 
0 0 5  1 23  FORMAT(' ',C5X,4A81 
1152 u q [ r F I b * I 5 1  
- 0 0 5 3  
- . - - . - . -.15-- FORM4T( / / *  * , ~ ~ X . ~ X ' , ~ X ~ ' P * , ~ X , ~ D ~ , ? X , ~ ? * , ~ X , ~ L ~ X I ~ , ~ X ,  . . . . . . .  T'C';IZR; , F , . I l )  .. -.- ... 
. . 
0 0 5 4  2 4  CONTINUE , 
. . .  ' . . .  . - O O  5 5  -- . -  - . . . .  *-l;l, * . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
I J 5 6  I F (  1-28 1 2 * 1 3 1 1 4  
UUS I 1L J'U 
0 0 5  8 - - . . . o  5 q - . . - . . . -  .. .. GO Tn  5 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13 - . J i l  
. . 
0 0 6 0  GD T n  5 
. - .  ... ....................................... - 1 9 6 1  * G  . - -J-5*(  
0 0 6 2  5 W R I T E ( ~ P ~ )  J , P ( l l r O f 1 1 ~ 0 ( l ) , 4 L ( I )  , C P L I I J v F ( I  1 
-7- 6 P I J ~ ~ ~ I  I. . 1 3 7 ~ ~ 1 3 ~  1 1 ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ 1 1 7 i i ~ ~ ~ 1 1 .  J , F L C . J I  
- . -  9 0 6 4  
- -  oo&5 . . . 
RFTURN 
............... . . . . . .  - - -  
FORTRAN. I V  C1.- .RFLFAS.E-z.O. . .. pVJ- -  .... -- CAT: = 7 6 3 6 5  1 4 / 0 1 / 2 5  m - - - -  
0 0 0  1 SIJRPUUTINE PPOJ ( P t A L 1 C P L S s F F M , Y F , N J M r 5 ~ T A P ! v Z ~ 5 r P D S I  
0032 - - L 7 i m o v  P ( ~ ~ ) , A L I I S I . C P L S I ~ ~ ~ L I ~ ? I  t i ~ m r T i T ~ - ; i l K - - ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ - ~  
e . - -- . - . . - . . .... - ... l P P I I J ! Z I J  ?F.?!!?!!!!!*SUH?!!!!*PPP(21) . -. . . . . . . . . . . . .  
2,YTFYPt 19 )  t N Y 6 ( 2 1 )  t P P S I 4 t Z l t 3 )  
3 . .  - -- .... . . .  REAL S . .- . e 7 -  0034  7 r r l E G ~ d .  A ; t ; t T ; ~ i t h B i ; ' i r f ' N ; P F ~ - ~ ~  
C START I S  THC VEAP AT WHICH THE P P n J F C l l J Y  RFClNS 
0 0 0  5 READ 1 5 t l l ~ l -  
1 1 3 1  FORHaT ( 1 4 )  e . .  0 0 % .  . . . .  hCXo-i31ir j.-.-.- . . . .  
0 0 0 7  
>??a . . 1 1 2 1  FORMAT 1 1 2 1  ...... e Z '-2 IS THE k u 4 e ~ F -  FIVE-VEbV.-m3jFtflilk5 70 R F  M A ? €  '- -- 
0 0 0 9  LOO FORMAT ( 1 1 1 R )  
C S I S  THE SEX m 0  
CI .. - .... - . "O1'?__ - _ . - ... _-4 i  j-78arinieT R E A O I 5 t 4 1 0 )  i67----.---- S . . .  . --- . . 
J J l l  
~ - - 
- -.0_0! 2- -- -- - ----LC. (r5EP.Z! COTO_3_50  - -  -. - - -- -- 
J J 1 3  REAO ( 5 t 1 1 . 3 )  ( R ( l l t l = l ~ I l )  
0 0 1 4  REAO ( 5 1 1 0 0 )  ( @ I  I), l = l l r 1 9 )  
0 0 1 5  DO 1 0 1  1-1919 
8 0 )  = 8 1 1 )  1 0 0 0  
-- ..O'?l'! -. - - -  - - - - - - 
0 0 1  1 F l  l rl)=FLOAT~BlI))/FLOAT~P~I 1 )
1 3 1  FI 1111=F(  1 i l ) / ( l . * S J  2!lt PA- - 
0 0 1  9 RO=O. 
9.12 I Rl=O. - 
0 0 2  1 0 0  2 0  1=4114  
-- --.ow 2 - X ~ S j I ~ Z J  - -.  . 
0 0 2  3 XI=X1+2.5 
RO-RO+CPLS( 1rNUCIrWFI*F( 1 t 14 
- .. -- . -.... -9 92 '? . -- . - - ... .- ...... 
3 9 2 5  2'3 R l = R l t X I * C P L S (  I t N U M i P F ) * F I l i l )  
0 0 2  6 RO=R0/100000. 
0 0 2  7 R L = R I / l O l l J 3 .  
XWM=5*(NUM-lJ 
.- - -  .?O_ztI - -  -. -. -- .- - -. - 
0 0 2 9  X W . ( 3 O . / X N U M ) * ( l . - R O ) / R l  
,1133 0 0  2 5  J=Z*NUU - - - - - ........ - ..... - - - - - .- - - - -  - . -. - -. - -  - - - - 
0 0 3  1 Or) 25  1=1119 
0332 x [ = p (  1-71 
0 0 3 3  Xl=X1+2.5 
0034 .  - X I P S ~ !  .I: )-_ - -_ __ 
.. . . 
0 0 3 5  25  F (  I i J ) = (  I . + X M r X I * X T / 3 0 . ) * F ( l r l )  
- ... -9916 . . . . . . . . . .  L . 1  . . .  . . . . . . . . . .  .. 
1 1 3 7  2 1 1  SUHH( 1 )=I. 
0 0 3 8  Or) 2 1 5  J'lrNIIM 
0 0 3 9  D O  2 1 5  1 x 4 7 1 4  
.. .OQ%Q .... .- _XI? 5.1 !:z?. ...... . . . . . . . . .  . 
0 0 1  1 2 1 5  SUNM(J)*SUM*( J)+.OOOOl*CPLS~ I t  J t V F l C F (  I t J )  
.... -- ? I 5 2  . .- - . . . . . .  - ... PC'- . l o o  J*  l l W J M .  . .. .- . . . . . .  . . . . .  
0 0 1 3  On 705 I = l ,  1 9  
0 0 4 4  1F (FILJJ.GE.3.11 GC TCI 715 -. . -- -- .. - .- -. - 
0 0 4 5  TMP=O. 
- - OQ+6 .. - .... 0U..706 K~!.919.. , - _  .. - .  
134 7 I F  IF(W,J).CE.O.O) 6 U  To 706 
OOQ8 WQlTE (69 7 1 0 )  K .J tF ( I ( t . I )  
004  9 
--- 7 1 0  FOPHAT 1 2 X t l 3 1 1 ~ 1 1 S T  F ( K t J l r S X t % 1 5 ~ 1  IL.hl/l) 
. . - . . . - - -  1 )5 ) ~ , y p  = f T p m  ' c  p n m r  I *TI(;---- 
. - . - . .  . 0 0 5  1 706 CONT IYl 'F  - -  
0 0 5 2  ~6 717  ~ 1 1 ~ 1 9  
0 0 5 3  7 0 7  FIR * J I = F (  KtJ)* :~UMW(J) / (SIJCIp(  J)-TMPJ 
0054 01 ton K=I*I$ 
>155  I F  IF(K,J).~;I.O.Ol G O  Tr) 708 
.... .. 0 0 5 6  +i.R- - - --- -- -- - .  t J 1  =U 
' 'ST . . 7 )R CONTINIJE . . . . . .  - .. 
905 8 Sur i i r l  J I=6. 
0 0 5 9  00 7 0 9  L = l  , l a  
7 6 9  SlJhMl J1-51lH.4(J I + . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ * C P C I I K . J , P F I + F I U ,  11 
0 0 6 1  GO TO 700 
1 1 6 2  -- - .- 1 1 5  3
0 0 6  3 7 0 0  C9NT IPlUF 
. . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . .  b o b 4  - - -  35,., CJNTIN"F 
0 0 6  5 P P ( l t l l = P (  l I + P I Z )  
0 0 6 6  . 00 1 0 2  1 = Z t 1 8  - - - -  - - . -  - .  . . 
1 1 6 7  1 1 2  PPI  l r l I ~ P ( I + l )  
o m e  LZ=L+I 
,3 )h 9 D;J 1 J 3  J=ZIZZ 
. . . . .  
- -c - - -IF JJ~J ;~ ;  T I~F-~J ITSFR~TFETI I  I rv'xvn i r rc  ran15 arrF USEQ . . - - .  
C FOR THE F I P S T  CYCLE OF PRPJECTION 
.. - c . . - - - . .  ....... . . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . - . - . - . .  
c I F  J J = J t  THEY ARE NOT 
- .- U ' J I  J 
J 9 7  1 
Po l l  J [ A T E  s 7 6 ? h ?  14 /  I Q / 2 5  F D Q T R A N  5ECFAsE ~ $ b ( ) ~ ' , J ) i p P [ ~ ; J - ~ r C C ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ P ~ ~ l z ~ ~ ~ ; ~ ~ l + ~ ~ ~ ~ 7  1;JJ;RFIl -- 0 0 7 2  
0073  on 1 0 4  1 ~ 3 ~ 1 8  
(i . -  0 0 7 4  " ' I W  PP1 T;'Jl.PPI I~SJ-TFtPCSTTTI;JJi~AFm~51I'YJJ;Rn- 
3 > ? 5  I F  IMF.EO.21 2 0  TO 457 
-mriU.o- 
- 
Po7a 0 0  7 . . . . . . . . . . . .  - 0 0  1 1 5  1 - 3 0 1 4  .- -- .. -. . .  - -- -- . -  - . - .- - . - 105-'SUR;SUMSt P P I I - ~ I W F r T X I  I t
-. , , . . - . . -. .- -  - . 
1 1 ~ C P L 5 ~ 1 ~ l t J J , Y F I / C P L S ~ I ~ J J ~ ~ F 1 1 * F ~ I + l ~ J . J ~ l ~  1 
P o l  l;Jl=0,5*(PLTl r;JJ;RFl'FCW~;JJ ;YF T I *SUHIaI:n-T- '- - .' '- -.- 
0 0 8 0  GO TO 103 
J ]ti 1 4.14 LIJN- 
0 0 0 8 2  . .  103 -.tDNTINUF-. P P l l ~ J I = S * ~ C P L S ~ 1 1 J J , M F l t C P L S ~ 2 ~ J J , V F ~ 1 4 F E ~ ~  . .... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  J , J J I / F F ~ ~ l . J J I  - . . . . . .  
0 0 8 3  
0 0 8 4  
. . 
F I N = S T A P T t I Z * 5 1  
f& 0 0 8  5 I ,MF Ea.Z ,. m.TT I 
. . - -. - - - - . - - . . - . . - . 
. 
> 1 0 6  Y R I T E t 6 r l l O l  STAPT.FIN 
W T T - - - -  ~ T - P l * , / f l ~ '  * r w t t m n ~ t  - - n A T m T 1 ~ ? , .  11 ) '  
l r 1 5 1  
...... . . . .  @ . .-0088. . . . . . . . . .  12-.... . . . . .  -- . . . . .  - i-- . . . . . . . .  ro 
0 0 8 9  1 1 1  WRITE (6 ,113)  START.FIN 
- -  '- 1 3 9 0  ' . 
.-. .  1 1 3 F f l R U K T  1 1  1';7111"-';'411~C ~POPl j I  4TTPF! PRFJFTTTON FaCi?', 15,' TO1 '- 
1 .151  
- - . - - .  - --A -  - - - - . - - . .- 
l l Z  V F T ~ R I J F  
@ 0 0 9 2  0 0  120 J = l t L Z  . . .  
0 0 9  J 1 2 0  P P P ( J I = I .  
a 0 0 9  4 @r) 1 2 5  J * l r Z Z  
3095 -- 071-12s ~ = . l  t e  . . .  
*pp ( [  ) ........ 0 0 9 6  1 2 5  PPPI G P D ~ D -  J 
@ .~ . "O??. . . . . .  PO p o o , ! r l , l p  
00'IR 6 6 6  NTEMP~ I I = 5 * t I - l i -  ' - -- ~ - -- 
9 ? 9 9  . . . . .  605 I=.z' zI- . . - .  -. -- . . . - - . . . .  NYR( l ,=STAQT e 0 1 0 0  
0 1 0 1  1191-1  . .  . . 
.. 
6 0 5  f V ~ ~ ~ f i I I 1 1 * 5  - -. - - - - --- -. - -  0 1 0 2  
.. ? ! ? i ,  ......... ;a, ,l;(?j;;; I-"-. .. - . . . . . .  .. - . - . . .  
3 1  1 4  10. 
(?lo?.. . . .  . . . . . .  - 00 1 3 5 - 1 r 1 . 3  . . . . . . .  
L, 35- pDs i; ,nF - - -  --- -- - - - - 0 1  1 6  =PPSI~,J .YFI+PPTL~I  ' .  ' . 
0 1 0 7  P P S l Z 2 J r M F I ~ O -  - - 
d l 0 8  03 1 3 6  1 1 4 ' 1 3  
., 
. .  . I!?''-.- . . . . . . .  1 3 6  ..... PPS! Z ? ?  lnF! ?P_P>!ZIJ~YF!!P?!L~J~..- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
0 1 1 9  PPS(3vJvMF 1x0. 
.----.Il!! - - C ? 0 1 3 T a ! 4 * 1 8 _  
C 13, PPSrj; J'MFi~PPS(3*J'YF)*F6Ti;jr. ' ' - - - -  -- -. 0 1 1 2  
0 1 1 3  130  P P S ( 4 ~ J ~ M F ) = P P S ( I ~ J ~ Y F I + P P S 1 2 1 J t M F l + P D 5 ~ 3 ~ J ~ ~ F l  
0 1 1 4  I F  (MF.EO.11 GO TO 138  
a 0 1 1 5  
- -. - - - . . 0 0  1 3 9  J= l ,ZZ  
6 3 - 1 3 9 . 4  
- - . -  -  -  -- - - . - -- 
1 1 1 6  
. - -.o L! 7 -  ! 3 9 P P S l  I!J~~)_'P_P_~_~L~I_LE~PSII.!_JLZ~-~- . .  .... - 
1 1 1 8  WRITE t 6 * 1 4 3 1  STARTSFIN 
0 1 1 9  1 4 0  FORMAT t *  1' , / '  ' * 'PnPULATIT)N PRJJFCTI'IN F P O Y *  ,IS,' 17 '  1151  
0 1 2 0  We1 TE ( 6 1  1411  
0 1 2  1 r ~ A ~ - F . _ O R _ F U ~ L ~ ~ . L X ~ ~ ~ ~ X ~ X *  15.:.$411Cd3. '&5+'. , Z R K ? I ~ ~ T ~ ? L '  , ~ . .16x !  - 
la.= T M' '19X 9 'F T W'*13X, 'F T * ' I  
.. . .  .. . . . C - . .- -- - - - - - - - - --- - - - . -- .- . 
2 1 9 X _ I F .  L - -_M!cLm - -. -- ._ -. - -. 
0 1 2 2  0 0  1 4 2  I = l * Z Z  
0 1 2 3  1 4 2  WRlTF 16,143) K Y P t I l ~ l P P S ~ l ~ I ~ M F l r P F = l ~ Z l , l P P S ~ 2 ~ l ~ M F l ~ M F = l , 2 l ~  
~ ( P P S I ~ ~ ~ ~ M F ~ ~ ~ F ~ ~ ~ Z I V ~ P P S ~ ~ ~ I ~ H F  l t C F = l ~ 2 l ~ t D D S t K ~ I  7 3 )  w K = l v 4 1  
0 
. . .  912% _ ~ _ ~ ~ F O R C I A T ~ ~ / ~ ~ ? L ! _ ~ L ~ X I Z F ~ Z - . O ~ A X ( Z ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ . X X ~ - ~ I Z . ? ~ ~ K ~ Z F ~ ~ . , J ~ / . ~ . L ~ ~ ~  
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For births the Coale and Trussell (1974) model tables were 
taken, using different mean age of childbearing (MEAN) and stan- 
dard deviation (STDEV) for developed and less developed regions. 
Those considered appropriate to the groups of countries are as 
follows : 
MEAN STDEV R1 
DCS 26.0 5.5 0.2732 
LDCs 28.0 6.5 0.3196 
Once the deaths and births for the three subgroups of LDCs 
were obtained, the total of the LDCs was found by addition, and 
similarly for the DCs. The world as a whole was the sum of the 
DCs and LDCs. 
OTHER ESTIIfiATES 
As among existing calculations those of the United Nations 
are most often quoted. These come in three variants, of which 
only the middle variant is published in detail. However, recent 
evidence shows that it is on the high side. In particular a 
number of countries have shown birth statistics that are lower 
than expected since the UN work was done in 1973. The UN low 
variant is not published in any detail, but I have been able to 
obtain from the United Nations the breakdown into more and less 
developed regions, and these are shown in Table 13. I would in- 
terpret these as an upper limit on what the population will be. 
That means that for the mid-2lst century one can count on a 
world total under 9 billions. 
Lester Brown has attracted wide attention in recent months 
with his report on world population (1976). He argues that the 
United Yations estimates are much too high. As evidence of this 
he cites the apparent rapid decline in the birth rate in China, 
the unanticipated fall to negative population growth in four 
European countries by 1975, and energetic population control 
measures in Mexico, Egypt, and many other countries of the Third 
World. He accepts that the world rate of population increase, 
as high as 1.90 percent in 1970, had fallen by 1975 to 1.64 
percent. 
It is not alone through the fall in the birth rate that 
Brown anticipates a further rapid drop in the rate of increase. 
Some recent upturns in national death rates, partly due to mal- 
nutrition, seem likely to continue. Overgrazing, deforestation, 
and overploughing are to be found on all continents, and appar- 
ently the world fish catch has passed its peak. Rising world 
food prices are bound to translate into rising death rates in 
the poorest countries. 
Demographers have by and large given up the search for 
mathematical functions that will fit a past population and pre- 
dict the future, but such may incidentally complement the work 
Table  13,  United Nat ions  low e s t i m a t e  f o r  t h e  y e a r s  1975 t o  
2100, showing more and less developed r e g i o n s ;  
( m i l l i o n s  of p e r s o n s ) .  
More L e s s  
developed developed 
r e g i o n s  r e g i o n s  
Year ( MDR) . (LDR) World 
Date 
Figure  4 ,  World popu la t ion  e s t ima ted  by l o g i s t i c ,  
from Roper (1976) .  
here using the components method. Roper (1976) provides a 
generalization of the logistic or inverse hyperbolic tangent. 
His fitted world population goes to an asymtote of about 
6 billion (Figure 4). 
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